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Abstract 
Post apartheid South Africa emerged at a time when the region was experiencing 
violent conflicts that had the potential of spreading to other countries in the region.  
South Africa, which was partly isolated during the apartheid era, woke up to the 
reality of the fact that it was part of the Southern African region and could not remain 
impartial to the political instabilities experienced by its neighbours.  
Since the region played a crucial part in the negotiated settlement of the dispute in 
South Africa in a peaceful manner, it was therefore in its interests to solve the 
political instabilities in the region peacefully.  Tools of conflict resolution, especially 
peacemaking which encourages warring faction to negotiate, became the strategy 
South Africa used to solve the regional instabilities.  
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the peacemaking efforts by South Africa in 
the Southern African region by examining instability in Lesotho as a case study.  The 
aim of the thesis is to test the hypothesis that the South African peacemaking 
strategy in Southern Africa yielded positive results. 
In investigating South Africa’s peacemaking strategy, using Lesotho as a case study, 
the thesis examines the causes of the political instability in the country and how 
South Africa tried to solve it.  The three main political parties in Lesotho, i.e. the 
Basotho National Party, the Lesotho Congress Party and the Marema Tlou Party, 
were the main parties that contested the elections in Lesotho.  Thus they were the 
parties that were involved in the negotiating process spearheaded by South Africa. 
South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe formed the South African Development 
Community Troika (SADC) Troika that played an important role in bringing about 
limited stability in Lesotho; the aim being to address the main causes of instability in 
the country.  
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Chapter 1 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Background to the study 
Africa is a continent that has various histories and geographical conditions.  It is a 
continent that has been affected by interstate conflicts; mostly since the colonial 
powers departed.  This might be attributed to the state in which the colonial powers 
left in the continent.  When the colonists left, the African leaders that emerged were 
not knowledgeable on issues of governance; hence some of them exercised control 
over all the powers of the state and political pluralism was suppressed.  The 
economic and political opportunities were available to those who were close to the 
leaders and those who supported them.   
During the cold war, African leaders were vital to the United States of America and 
the Union Soviet Socialist Russia (USSR) for spearheading their ideological 
agendas.  They did this by suppressing all the interest groups and opposition parties 
that had differing ideologies.   
The cold war came to an end, and Africa lost her relevance; not only to the two super 
powers but also to Europe at large.  The Soviet Union crumbled and the United 
States was focusing on the economic restructuring of her own economy and that of 
Europe.     
The nature of conflict had changed on the continent, and while the cold war era was 
dominated by interstate conflict, the post cold war era was dominated by intrastate 
conflict.1  Lesotho, like most African countries, was also faced with internal security 
problems that followed her independence from the colonial powers.   
These conflicts were not only targeted at the armies, but also at innocent civilians.  
                                            
1
 Anyidoho H.  Lessons Learned During Peacekeeping Operations in Africa.  Available from: 
http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monolgraphs/No10/Anyidoho.html .  p1. 
 2 
Thus, most people fled their home countries and took refuge in neighbouring 
countries.  The United Nations (UN) was eager to play its part in peacekeeping 
operations in Africa.  Although it was equipped to deal with interstate conflict, it was 
not equipped to handle intrastate conflicts.  Most of the UN operations in intrastate 
conflicts in Africa were not successful.  In Somali during 1992, the UN failed to 
resolve the conflict and this led to the further retreat of the international community 
from Africa.2  This failure affected the UN morale in dealing with intrastate conflict.  
This meant that African countries had to find their own solutions to their problems. 
The failure by the UN to resolve conflict in Africa left regional organisations and 
neighbouring countries as the ones that had to deal with conflict in their regions.  
Support and help from neighbouring states became crucial.  This was done through 
consultation with regional organisations.  Hence in 1992, the UN designated the role 
of keeping the peace to regional organisations.  Regional organisations were to work 
in consultation with the Security Council.  In Southern African conflict situations, the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) handled the resolution of 
conflicts.   
This was evident in Lesotho when South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana intervened 
in an attempt to solve the instability that plagued the tiny mountain kingdom. 
The aim of this research is to evaluate the effectiveness of South Africa’s 
peacemaking strategy and efforts in the Southern African region.  The focus of this 
research will be on South Africa’s involvement in Lesotho from 1998 to 2002.  The 
research will also examine South Africa’s foreign policy and its objectives in the 
region, and its commitment to peace as a pillar in Pretoria’s policy towards the region 
as well as the continent.  It will illustrate the complexities of formulating a coherent 
foreign policy for the new South African government.  Furthermore, the research will 
investigate South Africa’s willingness and capacity to work with the multilateral 
                                            
2
 Report of the Secretary-General: The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and 
sustainable development in Africa.  Available from: 
http://wwwnotes.releif.int/files/rwdomino.nsf/searchResults/EAB6C7BF0E86C1B852567920051FEDC
?OpenDocument.  p5. 
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organisations like SADC in dealing with security challenges in the sub region.   
The path to multi-party democracy in Lesotho has been that of tension and instability 
since their independence in 1966.  This occurred when the region was undergoing a 
process of transformation from colonial rule to self-independence.  Independence 
caused Lesotho to be subjected to external intervention because of the instability that 
it experienced.  The political instability in Lesotho occurred at the time Samuel 
Huntington referred to the third wave of democratisation, which covered the period 
1970-1974.  This was a time characterised by movements promoting democracy, and 
countries adopting a democratic government.3  Most countries in the region were 
beginning to open up their societies, making way for political reforms.   
Although Lesotho was a kingdom, there were political reforms that were introduced in 
the country during this era.  The government was separated from the monarchy and 
various political parties were formed in these countries.  The powers of the monarchy 
were no longer absolute. 
Due to its close proximity to South Africa, Lesotho’s instability was of great concern 
to Pretoria for the following reasons:  Firstly, because Lesotho is within South Africa’s 
borders, and also because solving conflicts peacefully in the sub region falls within 
Pretoria’s foreign policy objectives.  Secondly, South Africa’s goal of attracting 
investors in the region could not be achieved if the region was still plagued by 
instability.  Lastly, instability in Lesotho poses a threat to South Africa.  Furthermore, 
the region was also looking to Pretoria to help it deal with some of the conflicts that 
persisted after the end of the cold war.  This propelled Pretoria into introducing a 
foreign policy that would try to solve the challenges that the sub region was facing. 
When Nelson Mandela came to power as president, high hopes were placed on him 
that he would resolve conflicts in the region.  These hopes came after the peaceful 
settlement of conflict in South Africa itself.  It was hoped that Pretoria would play a 
big role in encouraging the peaceful settlement of conflicts in the region and in Africa 
                                            
3
 Huntington SP.  The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century.  Norman and 
London:  University of Oklahoma Press; 1991.p25 
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as a whole.  Mandela seems to have contributed to these sentiments by making 
statements indicating that he was committed to the peaceful resolution of conflicts in 
the region and in the whole of Africa.   
Thabo Mbeki, who became president after Nelson Mandela, seemed to be following 
in the footsteps of his predecessor when he declared that he wanted to solve 
conflicts in the region and on the continent in a peaceful manner using diplomatic 
means.  Mbeki came to power with a new vision for the continent, which he referred 
to as the “African Renaissance”.  Foreign policy in South Africa during his term in 
office would be seen within the broader policy objectives of the African Renaissance 
vision.   
Relations with African countries were conducted in a way that would enhance the 
vision.  This was because the achievement of the vision would be a major boost to 
the continent and would solve most of the challenges that have been experienced in 
the region. 
The tensions in Lesotho therefore gave Pretoria a direct test in solving conflicts 
peacefully in the region.  The ability of the new South African government to deal with 
conflicts in the region would be tested.  This was because Lesotho was within the 
belly of South Africa, and also because South Africa would have to start involving the 
Southern African region before facing more complex missions further afield. 
1.2 Rationale  
The 1994 political settlement in South Africa, which introduced democracy to the 
country, brought about expectations that the transition to democracy would be 
accompanied by significant changes in the foreign policy outlook.  This expectation 
was brought about because of the role that international players like the United 
States, Russia, United Nations, various African states and other regional 
organisations played in securing a negotiated settlement in South Africa.  This then 
presented South Africa with a challenge to play a constructive role in conflict 
resolution in Africa.  The deputy minister of foreign affairs, Aziz Pahad, captured it 
well when he stated that: 
 5 
“We did not see ourselves as playing a leading role in the region, but now we 
have come to understand that there is an expectation from Africa and the rest 
of the world that we have a role to play, a role of contribution to peace and 
stability in our continent and the African economic renaissance”.4 
From this statement, one can realise that South Africa would try to play a vital role in 
securing peace and stability in the region.  The point is that the strategy it adopted 
was largely diplomatic, not based entirely on military power.  However, the use of 
diplomatic strategies did not rule out the possibility of the military being used to 
achieve diplomatic ends. 
Lesotho presented a fitting case study to assess South Africa’s peacemaking role in 
the region, specifically its attempt to get the government and the opposition parties in 
Lesotho to reach a negotiated settlement.  Lesotho is a country that is geographically 
surrounded by South Africa and it is highly dependent on it economically.   
As indicated above, Lesotho is a country that experienced instability because of 
leadership tussles within all major political parties since independence in 1966.5   The 
instability in this country posed a challenge to South Africa in its attempts to secure 
peace in the sub region.  It was a threat because South Africa would face an influx of 
refugees which it would be expected to protect, and also because tension in that 
country would drive investors away from the region.  After coming into power in 1994, 
the new South African government adopted the policy of promoting peace in the 
region as part of its foreign policy goal.  Pretoria had to respond to the challenges 
faced by Lesotho.  Furthermore, Lesotho was of strategic importance to South Africa 
as the supply of water to Gauteng largely comes from Lesotho.   
South Africa also had the challenge of preserving peace in Lesotho as part of 
regional integration and also as part of promoting peace in the region.  As former 
                                            
4
 Address by Mr AGH Pahad, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the South African Institute of 
International Affairs.  Delivered on behalf of Mr AB Nzo, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 7th November 
1996.  Johannesburg.p2 
5
 Nzo A.  End of Year Report on Dept of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  December 1996.  
p3. 
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foreign minister Alfred Nzo once said, 
“The vision of South African foreign policy is that of a state of peace and 
prosperity in the region which would allow South Africa to outgrow its 
destination as a developing country”.6  
Thus Pretoria had to enter into bilateral and multilateral agreements with countries in 
the region, and on the continent at large. South Africa was given the role of 
managing the finance and investment portfolios and attracting investors into the 
SADC region in 1994.7  This has been difficult to achieve, with some countries in the 
region having experienced political instability.  It was due to this experience that the 
country tried to solve the security problems affecting the region.  Its policy in SADC is 
to build a stable and prosperous region that will attract investors.8   
This led the government to involve itself in regional conflict resolution in countries like 
Lesotho in 1998.  In its involvement in Lesotho during the intervention in 1998, South 
Africa sent troops to Lesotho in an operation which was highly criticised locally 
because of the lack of cooperation between the department of defence and 
department of foreign affairs, and also because of the lack of cooperation between 
South Africa and Botswana.  After the intervention, South Africa changed its strategy 
and adopted a peacemaking strategy and encouraged actions associated with 
diplomacy and negotiations between the government and the opposition parties.   
Most of the literature on South Africa’s involvement in Lesotho focuses on 
peacekeeping with particular attention on the intervention in 1998.  Not enough has 
been written about peacemaking in Lesotho, which covers the end of the intervention 
in 1998 until the election in May 2002.  The lack of data regarding the post 
intervention strategy created a need for research on the topic. 
                                            
6 National Implementation of Agenda 21: Southern African Development Community.  Available from: 
http://www.un.org./esa/earthsummit/sadc.cp.html. p 56. 
7 Matlosa K.  Political Turbulence Ahead of the 2002 General Election.  South African Economist Vol 
14, no 7, 2001.  p2. 
8 Baber, J.  South Africa’s Foreign Policy, in Albert Venter (ed.), Government and Politics in the New 
South Africa: An introductory reader to its institutions, processes and policies, Johannesburg, J.L. Van 
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1.3 Questions addressed by thesis 
This research will address the following questions.  What were Pretoria’s foreign 
policy objectives in SADC?  Why did Pretoria choose to use military intervention in 
Lesotho during 1998 while it refused to intervene in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC)?  Why did the process of peacemaking last until the elections of May 
2002?  Was the Mandela and Mbeki administration successful in meeting their 
peacemaking objectives, and if not, why?  What role did Pretoria play within the 
Troika?  Was the African Renaissance a proper vehicle to solve the tensions in 
Lesotho during the Mbeki era?  Is Pretoria’s peacemaking sufficient to deal with 
future tensions in the region?    
1.4 Theoretical framework  
Many scholars writing on South Africa’s involvement in Lesotho tend to regard South 
Africa as imposing itself on Lesotho’s domestic affairs.  They tend to focus more on 
the intervention of 22 September 1998.  This was when South Africa and Botswana 
went into Lesotho to quell a coup d’etat; the aim being to restore law and order in that 
country.9   
They also tend to focus more on peacekeeping that covers the period during the 
intervention in September 1998.  Peacekeeping in this research paper is defined as 
the deployment of troops by the United Nations or a regional organisation in the field, 
with the consent of all the parties concerned.  This study will take a different 
approach.  It will focus more on the post intervention strategy, which saw South 
Africa playing the role of peacemaker. 
The theoretical approach to be adopted by the study is conflict resolution and 
hegemonic stability theory.  There are different definitions of conflict resolution, and 
for the purpose of this study one should examine the writings of John Burton.  He 
defines conflict resolution as “… a facilitated analysis of underlying sources of 
                                                                                                                                        
Schaik.  1998.  p 320. 
9
 Van Nieuwerk, A.  The Lesotho Crisis: Implications for South African Foreign Policy in Lambrechts, K 
(ed) Managing conflicts in Southern Africa; Foundation for Global Dialogue, Braamfontein.  1999.  p13. 
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conflict”.10  This includes the process whereby institutional and policy options are 
discovered that meet the needs of the parties, thus establishing the basis for a 
resolution of the conflict. 
One of the concrete aspects of conflict resolution that will be used in this study is 
peacemaking.  According to Boutros Ghali, peacemaking is the action to bring hostile 
parties to agreement, essentially through such means.11   This includes mediation 
and intervention undertaken by a state or individuals designated by a regional 
organisation or by the Security Council.   
This theoretical approach will be used to explain what South Africa had been 
undertaking in Lesotho during the period covering the post intervention; i.e. the 
period from October 1998 until the elections in May 2002.  While some critics focus 
on the intervention in September 1998, they do not adequately examine the political 
issues leading to the elections in 2002.  They only serve to confuse issues around 
peacekeeping, which was prevalent during the intervention on 22 September 1998. 
Hegemonic stability theory assumes that stability in the international community 
requires a single dominant state to articulate and enforce the rules of interaction 
among the most important members of the system.12  This theory will help analyse 
South Africa’s involvement in Lesotho, as the involvement in Lesotho reflects South 
Africa’s hegemonic status in the region.   
South Africa, as a hegemonic power in the region, felt that it was in its best interests 
to preserve peace in Lesotho since peace in the region would help attract investors.  
This is because an unstable region will affect the region economically and 
technologically, and it will also undermine South Africa’s position as a hegemony in 
the region. 
Therefore the theoretical framework with conflict resolution and hegemonic stability 
                                            
10
 Burton, J.  Resolving deep-conflict: A handbook.  Lanhham, MD: University Press of America.  
1987.  p7. 
11
 Boutros Boutros-Ghali.  Op-cit.  p4. 
12
 Boutros Boutros-Ghali.  Op-cit p10. 
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theory will help the researcher to achieve the set of objective of the study, which is to 
investigate the effectiveness of the South African strategy of peacemaking in Lesotho 
during the stated period.  
1.5 Historical context of the thesis 
1.5.1 The SADC Troika and the tensions in Lesotho  
This study will examine the formation of the SADC Troika and its role in getting the 
opposition parties to negotiate in Lesotho.  This section will analyse the involvement 
of South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe as members of the Troika with the Interim 
Political Authority.  The section will also focus more on the South African efforts to 
help the Troika to bring the opposition parties back to the IPA, mostly when they 
disagreed.   
1.5.2 South Africa’s post election involvement in Lesotho 
This section will analyse the end of the tension in Lesotho during 2002 and the post 
election involvement of South Africa in Lesotho.  The post elections period witnessed 
more aid from South Africa to Lesotho.  Firstly, Pretoria wanted to help Lesotho move 
from their status of being the least developed country in SADC.   
This section will end by examining the contribution made by Presidents Mandela’s 
and Mbeki’s administration; most importantly, the contribution from the Department of 
Foreign Affairs in Lesotho.    
1.6 Methodology  
The methodology approach used in this research is the traditionalism or realist 
approach.  This approach is relevant to this research as the researcher is examining 
the diplomatic relations between South Africa and Lesotho since the inception of 
democracy in South Africa.  The history of the diplomatic relations between these two 
countries was necessary as it gives background information on what South Africa 
has been doing in Lesotho since the inception of the new democracy.   
This research is qualitative, and primary and secondary sources have been used for 
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this research.  Primary sources include official documents from the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and from the High Commissioner of Lesotho in Pretoria.  Speeches 
from Foreign Ministers from the South African government and from the Lesotho 
government have also been used, as have speeches from the former South African 
presidents, the minister of home affairs Dr Mangosutho Buthelezi, and opposition 
leaders and government officials in Lesotho.  Furthermore, the Internet sites of both 
governments were used.  The researcher also managed to visit the South African 
High Commissioner in Lesotho where he was given governments articles on the 
topic. 
Secondary sources include books, journals and newspaper articles from the South 
African Institute of International Affairs, while the Wits Library has journals and books 
on this topic which have also been sourced.  Government libraries in Maseru, the 
Transformation Centre, the Africa Institute in Pretoria, the Centre for Policy Studies, 
and the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Dispute (ACCORD), as well 
as the Department of Foreign Affairs were consulted, and all provided the researcher 
with relevant secondary sources for this research.   
1.7 Thesis outline 
Chapter 2: The electoral tensions - This chapter provides a detailed background to 
the study from the pre-independence period to the election in 1993.  The causes of 
the tensions between the major political parties and how the election contributed to 
the tension in Lesotho are examined.  This chapter ends by examining South Africa’s 
contribution to the tension in Lesotho. 
Chapter 3: South Africa’s foreign policy priorities in the region: The making of 
Lesotho policy - This chapter examines how South Africa made the maintenance of 
peace in the region one of its foreign policy objectives.  The chapter deals with 
Pretoria’s foreign policy objectives in the region and how these were implemented 
during the Lesotho crisis.  It also examines Pretoria’s security policy towards the 
region.   
Chapter 4: A multilateral approach to Lesotho’s crisis – This chapter examines the 
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role played by the SADC Troika in Lesotho and the exact role played by South Africa 
within the Troika.  It will also explore issues like the inevitability of the intervention, 
and whether the intervention managed to obtain the objectives that it was formed to 
achieve.   
Chapter 5: The African Renaissance era: Mapping the way through diplomacy – This 
chapter examines the African Renaissance vision and whether it was a proper 
vehicle to deal with the instability in Lesotho. 
Chapter 6: Conclusion - This section of the thesis will test the validity of the 
hypothesis by examining whether South Africa’s peacemaking strategy was 
successful in Lesotho.   
 12 
Chapter 2 
2 Historical background to the source of Lesotho’s instability 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the historical background to the tensions in Lesotho which 
were caused by the elections in Lesotho during the period 1966 to 1994.  The main 
focus of this chapter is to trace the historical background to the tensions in Lesotho, 
and how various regional powers, led by South Africa, responded.  These tensions 
occurred between the various political parties that contested the elections in Lesotho 
since independence.  As a historical background, the chapter will trace the tensions 
during the elections of 1965, 1970, 1986 and 1994.  Although this chapter deals with 
the historical background, more emphasis will be placed on the 1994 period. 
The first section of this chapter will analyse the period between the election of 1965 
and the independence of 1966.  This period covers the difficult times that evolved 
and examines how the Basotho National Party (BNP) had to face the challenges 
caused by the granting of independence by Britain.  It will also outline the problems 
faced by various political parties that contested the election under the Westminster 
style of constitution which was adopted from the British colonists.   
The second section of this chapter will look at the relations between apartheid South 
Africa and Lesotho.  It will attempt to show how the South African government 
worked closely with the government of Lesotho and later how things changed after 
the coup of 1970 with South Africa wanting Lesotho’s prime minister Leabua 
Jonathan to accept the results of the elections of 1970.  These elections indicated 
that he had lost the election.  This section will conclude by looking at the impact 
South Africa had on the tensions in Lesotho and the criticism the opposition parties 
voiced regarding apartheid South Africa’s involvement in the country.   
The third section examines how the political developments in Lesotho continued to 
worsen after the granting of independence.  It shows how the tension increased in 
Lesotho as opposition parties wanted to topple the government, and how the 
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government responded to the raids by the opposition parties.  The coups that 
followed the raids led to the eventual overthrow of the ruling party.   
The last part of this report will discuss the multilateral approach developed by SADC 
in dealing with the tensions in Lesotho during the period 1993-1994.  Solving 
disputes using the SADC body was part of South Africa’s foreign policy.  This 
approach was decisive in solving the palace coup of 1994.  However, the tensions 
that plagued the tiny mountain kingdom existed even after the intervention by the 
SADC countries. 
2.2 The period before independence 
In 1868 Lesotho was colonised by Britain.  The colonial power gave Lesotho her 
independence in 1964 when a Basotho delegation led by the king, heads of the 
political parties, and members of the constitutional commission went to London to 
make an appeal for independence.  During the meeting it was agreed that parliament 
was going to have two houses, as recommended by the commission.   
The two houses would compromise the Lower House, which would be elected by 
universal suffrage and would have 60 members.  An agreement was then reached 
that independence would be granted after 12 months from the negotiations of 1964.  
Various political parties in Lesotho began their campaign for the elections but later 
began to withdraw their campaigns after realising that the BNP might end up winning 
the elections.  The opposition parties and the king wanted Britain to stop giving 
independence to Lesotho.  The king presented his position to Britain that his people 
could not be given independence while there were political problems in the country.  
The opposition parties, on the other hand, wanted the independence to be 
suspended; arguing that Lesotho could not be ruled by a minority government.  Their 
arguments did not produce positive results since Britain had already prepared for the 
granting of independence to Lesotho.   
The granting of independence came at a time when the winds of change were 
blowing through the continent and most African countries were canvassing for the 
liberation of Africa.  Ideologies like Pan Africanism (which propagated an African 
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continent led by Africans) were becoming popular amongst African leaders and 
therefore independence for Lesotho was inevitable since it reflected the general 
mood for independence. 
2.3 The electoral model and the election of 1965 in Lesotho 
The origins of Lesotho’s instability began with the elections of 1965.  These elections 
were actively contested by the political parties.  Their protests led to the tensions that 
have plagued Lesotho since independence.  The results of the elections as such 
were not a problem; however, the problem was with the electoral model used in the 
country.    
Britain introduced the Westminster-style First-Past-The-Post model of elections in 
Lesotho.  The electoral model became part of the constitution of the country.  This 
model allowed the dominant party to win almost all the votes cast, thereby giving it 
the opportunity to form a majority government.  The constitution of Lesotho was 
changed to accommodate the electoral model which was introduced at 
independence.   
The new constitution was known as the Westminster-style constitution.   
Lesotho was divided into 80 constituencies, which were equal, and during the 
elections the constituencies were supposed to elect one person to represent them in 
the Assembly.  This meant that the individual, and not the party, was the legal 
representative of the voter within the parliament.  Political parties do not stand as 
candidates within the constituencies; they could only elect a person they would like to 
represent them within a given constituency.  This system had advantages and 
disadvantages; some of which continue to be part of Lesotho’s politics to date..   
2.3.1 Advantages of the Westminster model 
• It was a territory based system and ensured more accountability.  The individual 
elected was accountable to the constituency within the parliament.  However, he 
does not only represent the party that elected him in parliament.  He represented 
the constituency at large and must account for their needs in parliament. 
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• The individual elected is from his party’s manipulation; free from being used as a 
tool of his political party.  As indicated above, he was only accountable to his 
constituency.   
• It allowed for the individual to leave his party and join another party in the 
parliament and oppose his former party if the interests of his constituency were 
not properly addressed. 
• It ensured strong government since it produced a single party leadership.  The 
advantage of this was that there would not be a compromise when issues of 
policy were implemented.13       
This model, however, was not immune from weaknesses; especially when introduced 
in small countries that still had a monarchy as the head of state. 
2.3.2 Disadvantages of the Westminster model 
• It tended to ensure an election contest between the two stronger parties, with the 
smaller parties likely to fall out. 
• It did not produce a multi-party democracy. 
• It gave the largest party the opportunity to form the government on its own and 
allowed it to dominate the second largest party.14 
This model, as indicated above, was introduced in Lesotho by Britain.  It had to run 
parallel with the old traditional system with the king in power.  The two systems were 
inconsistent and could not operate in the same country without producing 
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discontentment.  The Western system and the old traditional system did not 
complement each other.  This was because the Basothos were used to the king as 
their sovereign ruler and not the government system, which was introduced at 
independence.  Thus the preparations for hosting the elections in Lesotho were 
plagued with instability, not only between the political parties but also between the 
supporters of the king who wanted the king to be given more power in the running of 
the state.   
They were not prepared to give power to the modern government system that was to 
take place in the country.  Also, the people were not prepared to be ruled by a 
government which was not part of the monarchy; thus the very first elections were 
highly contested by the king and those who followed him.    
On the 29th of April 1965, elections were held in Lesotho.15  These elections were 
held under the new constitution, which was introduced by Britain.16  The main political 
parties that took part in the elections were the Basotho National Party (BNP), which 
was more conservative and drew more support from chiefs and the Catholics led by 
Leabua Jonathan.  The Basotho Congress Party (BCP) was more communist in 
outlook and was led by Ntsu Mokhehle who was once part of the Pan African 
Congress (PAC) when he stayed in South Africa.  Lastly, the Marema Tlou Freedom 
Party was more traditionalist and in favour of the monarchy.17  The BCP was 
regarded as the most organised party of the three parties and therefore expected to 
win the elections.  It consisted of academics and professional people who helped in 
the organisation of the party.  There were other smaller parties that were formed in 
Lesotho but their presence was overshadowed by the major parities mentioned 
above.18  
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The results of the elections were that the BNP was the winner with 31 seats and 
41.6% of the votes, the BCP won 25 seats (37.7%) and the Marema Tlou Freedom 
Party won the remaining 4 seats with 16.5% of the vote.19  This meant that the BNP 
was the minority winner since they did not win 50% of the votes cast.  The BNP’s 
leader chief, Leabua Jonathan, was elected as prime minister in a by-election held on 
the 7th of July 1965.20  The BCP did not accept the results, accusing the BNP of 
cheating in the elections.  The opposition parties, led by the BCP and the Marematlo 
party could not allow a minority government in power.  The tension emerged between 
the BNP and the opposition parties that were not willing to accept the government of 
Leabua Jonathan.  This happened at a time when Lesotho was not doing well 
economically and the British government did not do anything to help the economy of 
Lesotho to grow.  The economy was affected by a lack of aid from South Africa and 
also from international donors. 
During the election campaign the BNP indicated that it preferred a peaceful 
coexistence with South Africa.  It seems probable that the BNP won the elections 
because of the policy it was following.21  Their policy was welcomed by the apartheid 
government, which helped it during the election campaign.  The BCP, on the other 
hand, led by Ntsu Mokhehle, followed a policy that gave priority to the issue of 
independence, while the MTFP preferred friendly relations with South Africa in the 
economic sphere and a strengthened position of the paramount Chief.22  The BNP 
policy enabled them to be on good terms with Pretoria; hence they were allowed to 
campaign in the mines.23   
The relations between South Africa and Lesotho could have changed if the BCP had 
won the elections.  This could have had an impact on the Basotho miners who were 
working in the mines in South Africa.   
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2.4 The causes of the tension and the issue of independence  
The results of the elections caused tension between the ruling party, the monarchy, 
and the opposition parties in Lesotho.  Opposition parties did not want to accept the 
results, blaming the BNP for cheating.  The big issue behind this was that the BCP, 
as mentioned before, was regarded as the most organised party and it was expected 
to win the elections.24  They therefore accused Leabua Jonathan of cheating and 
forming a minority government since his party only won 41.73% of the votes cast.   
They demanded a date for the new elections to be held.25  Their argument was that 
the BNP could not rule the country with a minority government.26  They decided to 
halt the issue of independence for as long as Jonathan was in power.  The king 
supported this motion since he was not enjoying good relations with the prime 
minister.  This was because the prime minister wanted to reduce the powers given to 
the monarchy.  He proposed stopping the process of independence until the nation 
was united.  However, his proposal failed since Britain rejected all the claims he 
brought before them, and gave Lesotho her independence in 1966, a few months 
after the elections of 1965.27 
The problem of non-acceptance of the election results was not that the winning party 
had cheated during the voting as has been suggested by the opposition parties.  The 
electoral model used had created problems of representation in the parliament.  It 
excluded other parties from the parliament and allowed the winning party to form the 
government on its own and make policies without being questioned on policy 
choices.   
2.4.1 South Africa-Lesotho relations 
The relations between South Africa and Lesotho were moderate at the time of the 
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elections because the prime minister preferred coexistence with his dominant 
neighbour.28  This attitude emerged when most countries were beginning to attack 
South Africa for its apartheid policy.  The closer relationship between the two 
countries was understandable since Lesotho’s geographical location makes it 
depend on its dominant neighbour economically.29  The relations between South 
Africa and Lesotho were not only important to Lesotho but also to South Africa, since 
she wanted allies to fight against the liberation movements.   
However, closer relations with South Africa were against the aspirations of the 
Basotho people, some of whom were subjected to the apartheid environment while 
working in the mines in South Africa, and those who were not happy with Pretoria’s 
policy of separate development.30  One strategic demand Pretoria brought forward 
was that Lesotho would not attack the apartheid government since this would 
jeopardise their relationship.31 
The South African government was happy with the BNP’s policy towards the republic.  
The moderate attitude displayed towards the country gave the prime minister the 
advantage of being the only one allowed to campaign in the mines.  Pretoria 
endorsed its appreciation of Jonathan’s policy by sending 100 000 bags of maize to 
Lesotho.32  This was to encourage acceptance of Pretoria’s domestic policy of 
apartheid.  Pretoria was in need of Lesotho as an ally to prevent it from harbouring 
African National Congress (ANC) and Pan African Congress (PAC) refugees who 
were fleeing the country.  Chief Jonathan saw Pretoria’s offer as fulfilling his bread 
and butter strategy, which he had promised the Basothos during the elections in 
1965.  He did not realise that South Africa was appeasing him because of the 
support they wanted in fighting ANC refugees in Lesotho..   
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Lesotho’s natural resource is water, which derives from the mountain areas.  This 
water was a resource that led to the creation of the Oxbow scheme, which proposed 
that a dam be constructed on the upper reaches of Orange River in Lesotho.   
The project would provide water and power to South Africa.33  Jonathan was slow to 
realise that his attitude towards Pretoria would not help keep him in power in 
Lesotho.  This is because most Basothos were not happy with their neighbours 
interfering in their domestic affairs.  This attitude towards South Africa was reflected 
in the elections of 1970.   
2.4.2 The post independence elections and the cabinet coup of 1970 
The first post independent elections in Lesotho were held in 1970, as it was stated in 
the constitution that after a period of five years there should be new elections.  This 
was the time that was crucial for the opposition, certainly the BCP, because the ruling 
party was experiencing domestic difficulties.  It was struggling; firstly with the 
monarchy which was not on good terms with the government, and also because the 
relationship with South Africa was not good since Pretoria was not happy with 
Jonathan’s coup.  The BCP by this time had normalised the relationship with the 
monarchy and this assured them of support from the king.34  It was crucial for them to 
normalise relations with the king since he continued to command influence over the 
citizens of the country. 
During the election campaign, the opposition parties accused Jonathan’s government 
of selling out to South Africa.  They were of the view that the relations between South 
Africa and Lesotho did not benefit Lesotho, like the chief had anticipated.  To counter 
the opposition, Jonathon accused the BCP of being closer to the communist 
countries.  He was not aware that the Basotho people were more concerned with the 
issue of incorporation by South Africa.  They would prefer limited relations with South 
Africa and closer relations elsewhere.  Jonathon was still adamant about the 
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relationship with South Africa.  On January the 27th 1970, elections were held in 
Lesotho.  The BNP did not perform well since it did not get financial support from 
South Africa and it also lost support because of its relations with South Africa.35 
The election results were not released but media reports indicated that the BCP had 
won the elections.  According to media reports the BCP won 36 seats, the BNP won 
23 seats and the MFP won 1 seat.36  Before the results were released, prime minister 
Jonathan and his cabinet sensed defeat.  They decided to meet and take action to 
nullify the election.  On Friday the 30th 1970, Chief Jonathan made an announcement 
on a radio station that he has been compelled to impose a state of emergency, 
dismiss the constitution, and that he had taken over power.37  He accused the 
opposition parties of causing violence in the polling stations.  He then arrested 
opposition leaders, including Mokhehle, and put the king under house arrest while all 
opposition publications were banned.38  Jonathan’s allegations of the opposition 
parties causing violence in the polling stations were contradicted by the radio and 
newspaper article announcements that the elections were peaceful.39 
The government coup was neither accepted in Lesotho nor externally.  South Africa 
did not support the coup; instead it preferred working with Mokhehle rather than with 
the prime minister whose government was illegitimate.40  Supporting the coup would 
have brought more criticism against the apartheid government.  The apartheid 
government’s feeling towards Jonathan caused the relationship between these two 
countries to deteriorate further.  Jonathan mistakenly thought that South Africa would 
support him since his government was on good terms with the republic.  This was not 
the case, and the chief decided to change his attitude towards the republic.  He 
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started to attack South Africa’s apartheid policy, warning it of violent changes that 
would occur in the country.41  
He also accused the apartheid government of interfering in Lesotho’s domestic 
affairs and indicated his disapproval of its domestic policy.  Pretoria would have 
responded to Jonathan; however the South African prime minister, John Vorster, did 
not respond immediately to Lesotho since his government did not have want a hostile 
country within its borders.  This was because Lesotho was vital for Vorster’s 
government if they wanted to capture the African National Congress refugees who 
had fled to Lesotho when the apartheid government came into power.   
The British government also followed by withdrawing its diplomatic relations in 
Lesotho.  The former colonial government could not have recognised the illegal 
government of the BNP.42  It suspended the budget and development aid which was 
destined for Lesotho.  This was a blow to the mountain kingdom since the British 
withdrawal would leave Lesotho at the mercy of South Africa.  It was unlikely for the 
chief to get all the help he wanted from Pretoria since the relationship between the 
two countries was not good during this time.  Furthermore, other countries would only 
respond after Britain responded.   
Internal clashes emerged between the non-governmental supporters, the Police 
Mobile Unit, and the BNP youth league.43  The government was successful in quelling 
all the demonstrators.  However, there was a need to normalise the situation at the 
home front and this would require a negotiated settlement.   
Chief Jonathan started a series of talks with the arrested opposition leaders.  They all 
agreed to nullify the election results of 1970 and start new elections.44  Jonathan 
promised that there would be a possibility of a National Government in the future.  
This did not happen.  Instead, Jonathan announced that he was taking five years 
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holiday from politics.  Had the National Government been formed, Mokhehle could 
have demanded more representation in the parliament.  This was something 
Jonathan could have rejected.  Instead, he withdrew from the talks about the National 
Government because he was aware of their implications.   
2.4.3 Opposition parties’ response to the coup of 1970 
The opposition parties were not happy with the self-imposed government of 
Jonathan.  People were also not happy with the political situation in their country.  
Furthermore, South Africa was also not willing to work and support the unpopular 
government of Jonathan.  All these sentiments led the opposition parties to attempt a 
coup in 1972.  However, this was not successful as the government was effective in 
halting their action.45  The government of Jonathan accused South Africa of 
supporting the opposition parties to launch a coup against the government.  These 
allegations might have had grounds since South Africa was critical of the anti-
apartheid speeches Jonathan used to utter.   
Jonathan lambasted Pretoria in his speeches saying they must be careful about their 
domestic policy, which was oppressing the black masses.  He did this because he 
believed that his party had lost the elections because of the close relations he had 
with the apartheid government and also because most countries were attacking 
South Africa during those days.46 
The accusations come at a time when the apartheid government was facing various 
challenges within African and internationally.  Such accusations were not well 
accepted by the apartheid government.  They only served to worsen the relations 
between the two countries. 
Lesotho’s economy was not doing well because of the political situation, and the 
Chief decide to opt for a normalisation of the political situation at home.  He then 
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decided to lift the state of emergency on the 25th of July 1973.47   To normalise the 
situation at home he came forward with a proposal for the Interim National Assembly 
(INA) which would try to propose a new constitution in Lesotho.48  The INA was to 
consist of 22 principal chiefs who had formally sat in the senate, nominees who had 
rendered national service, and nominees selected from lists provided by the major 
political parties in the spirit of National Reconciliation and National Unity. 
The Assembly was to have 93 members.49  The BCP rejected the Assembly with 93 
members; they preferred an Assembly with 60 members, equally representative of all 
the parties.  This rejection led to splits with the BCP itself, with Ramorebeli leading 
those who wanted to take part in the Assembly, and Mokhehle with those who 
rejected the Assembly.50  
2.4.4 Pretoria and the military response to Lesotho   
South Africa’s relations with Lesotho continued souring from 1985 onwards, and now 
Pretoria was prepared to use military tactics to hit back against the government of 
Leabua Jonathan.  This became part of the apartheid government’s outward policy 
that was aimed at destabilising its neighbours; mostly those that were housing ANC 
refugees.  Jonathan’s changed attitude towards his neighbour was not well accepted 
by his party members.  They decided to split away from the main party to form a 
faction led by Manyeli who preferred closer cooperation with Pretoria.51  
These events made Jonathan realise that he needed to calm relations with Pretoria.  
A meeting was scheduled for the chief to meet with the South African Prime Minister 
in 1973, but this meeting did not take place.  Instead the division between these two 
countries continued to widen.   
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The Lesotho Liberation Army then started to take the advantage of the sour relations 
between these two countries.  Led by Mokhehle, they started to launch attacks 
against the Lesotho government.  The attacks by the LLA perpetuated Jonathon’s 
accusation that Pretoria was obstructing economic development and interfering in its 
domestic affairs.52  The LLA activity and the ANC refugees in Lesotho increased as 
Jonathan was attacking Pretoria.  The apartheid government was pleased to see its 
hostile neighbour in turmoil.  There were indications that the LLA was operating from 
South Africa.   
This caused the opposition parties to take advantage of the political situation in the 
country and they launched a coup in 1974.  Mokhehle and his faction in the BCP 
joined Catholics, Anglican and Evangelicals to demonstrate, asking the Chief to form 
a Government of National Unity representing all political parties.53  Jonathon did not 
yield to their demands; instead he crushed all demonstrations in the country and 
forced the leaders of the opposition parties, including Ntsu Mokhehle who fled to 
South Africa where he continued the activities of the LLA.  South Africa did not stop 
the LAA from launching attacks from within the country.  Instead the government 
allowed these activities, thinking that it would give them more opportunities to attack 
the ANC refugees who were hiding in Lesotho.   
The political developments in Lesotho deteriorated and this compelled Jonathon to 
initiate plans to form a new constitution which would solve the situation in the 
country.  He indicated that the 1966 independence constitution would be abolished, 
the king would be a constitutional monarchy, the local government would be given 
more power, and all the criminals including Mokhehle would be banned; even their 
bodies would not be buried in Lesotho.54   
To get the support to calm the situation at home, he went to meet the South African 
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foreign minister on the 8th of April 1974 on the Peka Bridge over the Caledon River.55 
It was not surprising that the meeting was followed by a relative decline in the 
activities of the LLA, suggesting that the South African government was supporting 
them.  Jonathon’s attack on the apartheid government was expected to be minimal.  
However, the most outstanding issue, which was not well addressed in the meeting, 
was the conquered territories which Lesotho was still claiming.  Jonathan threatened 
to take the issue to the United Nations.  This was an issue that was still threatening 
the relationship between the two countries, even after the meeting.   
2.4.5 The end of the Jonathan era and the emergence of military 
government  
The BNP was forced to arrange a date for new elections in 1985 since pressure was 
exerted upon the government internally and externally.  The LLA was continuing its 
attacks on the government, and foreign donors decided to withdraw their funds from 
Lesotho.  The elections were held in 1985.   
This time only the BNP campaigned and won all the seats since the opposition 
parties did not campaign, complaining that the election procedure favoured the 
BNP.56  This led to the overthrow of the government by the military in 1986, led by 
Major General Justin Lekhanya.   
Many people welcomed the coup since they thought that the military government 
would restore democratic rule and encourage the creation of the government, which 
would bring about national reconciliation.  The overthrowing of the government came 
at the right time for Pretoria since it meant that the hostile government was gone, and 
also that it might get an ally to expel ANC refugees from the kingdom. 
The situation changed and did not reflect what the people were hoping.  Political 
activities were not allowed and the government was not willing to introduce 
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democracy in the country.  King Moshoeshoe II was the only one who was well 
recognised by the military and had been given the chance to participate in the politics 
of the country.57  This was a strategic decision by the military.  They realised that they 
would needed the king, since he was the only person who could bring about 
reconciliation in the country, and also that the king was needed for the military 
government to be accepted by the people.  He was given executive and legislative 
powers and also reinstated as the head of state.  Lekhanya was the chair of the 
military, meaning that the king would not have the powers over the military.   
The relations between the king and the military soon changed; with the supporters of 
the monarchy council wanting a government based on chieftaincy and absolute 
powers for the king, and the king accusing the military government of corruption and 
violations of human rights.58 
The king was then stripped of all his powers and then sent into exile.  He was 
replaced by his son, Letsie III.  During that time the military was enjoying the powers 
that might have changed Lesotho into a military authoritarian government.  However, 
the power of the military government led to discontent in Lesotho, which in its turn led 
to the increase in the armed forces against the government.  The armed forces and 
the disappointment from the civilians made it difficult for the military government of 
Lekhanya to rule the country effectively.   
To restore order in the society, Lekhanya promised that there would be a 
democratically elected government in Lesotho under a revised constitution.59  This 
could have created the base for democracy in the country.  However, he did not stay 
long as Major General Elias Ramaema ousted him.  This general was said to 
continue with the democratisation programme, which Lekhanya had started.   
King Moshoeshoe II came back from exile and took over the throne from his son.  
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The political situation was calmed with the new military government restoring political 
activity in the country and also encouraging multi-party democracy.  There were 
preparations for the elections, which would bring an end to the military government 
and bring back the civilian government in Lesotho.  The date for the election was 
initially November 1992, but it was postponed to January 1993, and then finally 
postponed to March 1993.   
2.4.6 The election of 1993 and the emergence of the SADC Troika: the 
beginning of a multilateral approach to Lesotho’s politics. 
Elections were held in Lesotho and were considered to be free and fair by local and 
international monitors.  The constitution of 1966 was revised but not completely 
changed.  The election results announced the BCP as the winner with 75% of the 
votes.  This meant that they won 65 seats in the parliament.  The BNP won 20% and 
no seats in parliament, and neither did any other opposition party win a seat.60  
This victory indicated what has been argued above, that the problem with the 
elections in Lesotho was with the model that was being used.  The model was not 
well implemented in the country.  It was not only disadvantaging the opposition 
parties but it was also in constant friction with the monarchists.  This period marked 
the very end of the BNP power in Lesotho.  Ntsu Mokhehle was elected as the prime 
minister and democracy was then introduced in Lesotho.  The problem that the BCP 
had to face by then was that most civil servants were from the opposition parties and 
some were from the supporters of the monarchy.  This meant that government of the 
day was in power but to lacked support from the police and military which are the two 
important sectors that the government need to work with. 
The opposition parties led by the BNP were not happy of the defeat.  They decided to 
contest the results of the elections.  Their contest was facilitated by the fact that the 
civil servants did not support the government.  They demanded the king dismiss the 
government on the grounds that it was incapable of ruling the country.  The king, in 
August 1994, followed their demands by announcing on radio that he had seized 
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power and dismissed the constitution; thus bringing the process of democracy to a 
halt.  This happened when the political environment in the region had changed.  This 
time, SADC was prepared to take a multilateral approach to intervene in Lesotho.  
Three countries, namely Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe were tasked with the 
duty of seeking peace and bringing back a democratically elected government in 
Lesotho. 
2.4.7 South Africa and the 1993 elections in Lesotho 
In the period 1993, South Africa was undergoing a process of transition from 
apartheid to democracy and focused more on its domestic affairs.  However, the 
developments in Lesotho could not be ignored.  The apartheid government was not 
prepared to send its troops to Lesotho since this might have brought more criticism 
against them.  The African National Congress had abandoned the armed struggle 
and was in favour of a negotiated settlement in Lesotho.  Thus in 1994, de Klerk and 
Mandela, together with Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Ketumile Masire, President 
of Botswana, urged the conflicting parties in Lesotho to negotiate.   
2.5 Conclusion  
The democratic process in Lesotho was difficult to achieve.  This difficulty can be 
traced back to the electoral model, which was used in the country.  The Westminster 
constitution, which was introduced in Lesotho by Britain, did not suit the tiny 
mountain kingdom.  Instead it was a source of controversy and tension.  This was 
clearly seen during the elections of 1965 and also 1993.  The parties that were 
thought to have won the elections were the losers and this created tension in the 
country.  This tension became part of Lesotho’s politics since independence.   
South Africa, with regional power, could not ignore the political tension that plagued 
their neighbouring countries.  They had to respond to quell the tension.  Solving 
conflicts in the region falls within the New South Africa’s foreign policy.  Its 
involvement in Lesotho should be seen within the broader framework of regional 
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policy.  However, solving the political tension in Lesotho was the most challenging 
policy in the new South Africa. 
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Chapter 3 
3 South Africa’s foreign policy priorities in the region: The 
making of Lesotho policy 
“As South Africans we are proud of our achievements but we do also recognise that 
the challenges that lie before us are no different to those faced by the region and 
indeed Africa as a whole.  Common needs and interdependence dictate a common 
interest in regional integration and reconstruction” (Nelson Mandela)61 
3.1 Introduction 
South Africa underwent a process of transition to democracy, which started with the 
introduction of democracy in the country in 1994, and Nelson Mandela’s release from 
prison in 1990.  This process came into being because of the pressure exerted on 
the apartheid government.  The outcome of these engagements led to a negotiated 
settlement and elections being held in South Africa.  The African National Congress 
(ANC) won the elections and Nelson Mandela became the new democratically 
elected president of South Africa.  The ANC government had been accusing the 
apartheid government of abusing human rights, and now that they were in power, it 
was henceforth expected that they would come up with a different domestic and 
foreign policy; one which was contrary to that used to oppose them.   
Most African countries were hoping that the new South Africa would move quickly to 
do away with the outward policy of destabilising her neighbours.  The apartheid 
government, in pursuit of ANC members in neighbouring countries, had introduced 
the policy of destabilisation.  The new South Africa had to face the challenge of doing 
away with the policy, as expected by her neighbouring countries.  As the late Foreign 
Affairs minister Alfred Nzo noted:  
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“The liberation of South Africa and South Africa’s destabilisation brought 
great possibilities for the development of our sub region.  We must translate 
these hopes into realities”.62 
The transition to democracy also brought hope that it would be characterised by 
improvements in the area of foreign policy.  James Barber pointed out, rightly, that 
there was an expectation that the new South Africa would play a sound role in the 
world politics and also in spreading democracy in the region.63  This expectation was 
understandable given the role that the international community played in securing a 
negotiated settlement in South Africa.  In the area of conflict, particularly in Africa, 
Pretoria was perceived as one country that was likely to prefer negotiated 
settlements as opposed to military settlements.  It was also expected that the new 
South African government would play a pivotal role in spreading democracy in Africa.   
Mandela’s government was seen as the one that could lead these initiatives because 
of the country’s economic strength.  It is therefore understandable for South Africa to 
prioritise on her region in terms of foreign policy, given the role that the region played 
during the liberation struggle and then in Africa and elsewhere in the world.  This 
chapter examines South Africa’s foreign policy in perspective.  The first part of this 
chapter examines South Africa’s policy in general; this will be followed by the policy 
towards SADC and Africa.  The second part examines security concerns with 
Pretoria, and the last part examines South Africa’s policy towards Lesotho.  This 
includes Pretoria’s involvement in Lesotho’s politics since the palace coup of 1994.  
This analysis helps position Pretoria’s policy with regard to Lesotho.   
3.2 South Africa’s foreign policy in perspective: The search for a 
moral dimension 
The new South African government came into power when the international events 
                                            
62
 Alfred Nzo Statement in general debate of the Fifth session of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations, 6 October 1995.www.gov.za/research97cgi/s97.  p2. 
63
 Baber J.  South Africa’s Foreign Policy, in Albert Venter (ed.), Government and Politics in the New 
South Africa: An introductory reader to its institutions, processes and policies.  J.L. Van Schaik:  
Johannesburg; 1998.  p320. 
 33 
were changing.  One can quickly quote the demise of the Soviet Union and the end 
of the cold war in 1989.  This historic event contributed significantly to the settlement 
that took place in South Africa.  The end of the cold war meant that the importance of 
African countries declined on the world stage.  The United States in particular was 
now focusing on its economy and the post cold war economies of Europe and the 
Middle East.  This was a time when most African countries were not doing well 
economically.  Instead the remnants of the cold war conflict were still prevalent as 
most countries in Africa were caught up in civil war.  Some of these civil wars were 
results of the cold war conflict.  In Angola the government of Dos Santos, which was 
supported by the Soviet Union, was in conflict with the UNITA rebels led by Savimbi, 
who were once supported by America and the apartheid government during the cold 
war.  These wars continued in Africa, even when the cold war had ended. 
Democratisation and the protection of human rights were attached to aid, mostly from 
Western donors.  The new South Africa emerged in that context and had to comply 
with the changing environment of the day.  This placed a huge burden on Pretoria 
since it had to change its policies.  As Alfred Nzo noted: 
“The events in 1994 in South Africa marked the break with the past, as well 
as a commitment to the future, placing a heavy burden on us.  As a young 
democracy we are ready to meet the challenge.  South Africa will meet this 
challenge with firm commitment”.64 
The realities faced by African countries and the changing international settings then 
influenced Pretoria’s foreign policy.  Thus in 1994 the ANC government devised a set 
of moral principles in its foreign policy, which were as follows: 
• The promotion of democracy and human rights, which was based on the 
assumption that solutions to humankind’s problems would come through 
democracy and human rights. 
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• The promotion of international peace as a goal to which all nations must strive. 
• A commitment to the development of the African continent and Southern African 
region in particular. 
• A belief that South Africa’s economic development depends on growing regional 
and international economic cooperation in an interdependent world.  
• That international relations must mirror our deep commitment to the consolidation 
of democratic South Africa.    
• Underpinning all this is South Africa’s anti-imperial, anti-colonial and anti-
neocolonial commitments in international relations. 
• Development of a just and equitable world order in which tackling the problems 
facing South Africa, Africa, and indeed the whole of the south, is at the top of the 
international agenda.65 
These policies were indicative of a moral stance the ANC government was taking 
towards international relations.  It was, however, understandable for the ANC 
government to put these moral principles forward in its foreign policy.  The 
experience of oppression during the apartheid era contributed to a moral approach in 
the ANC government’s foreign policy.   
3.3 South Africa’s African policy 
One thing that the new South Africa realised was that it had to integrate itself with 
African countries and also with the Southern African region in particular.  This 
commitment to join the region came with the realisation that South Africa was being 
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regarded as a Western country within an African continent.  Moreover, African 
countries had to start trusting Pretoria and start working with them.  This was 
something the president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela was cognisant of.  There 
was a need to start working together with the neighbouring countries and also with 
the continent.   
Nelson Mandela noted that: 
“We are part of the region of Southern Africa and of the continent of Africa.  
As members of the Southern African Development Community and the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and an equal partner with other member 
states, we will play our role in the struggle of these organisations to build a 
continent and a region that will help to create for ourselves and all humanity a 
common world of peace and prosperity”.66 
The Southern African region and Africa were a priority in Pretoria’s foreign policy.  
However, it must be noted than its foreign policy towards Africa differs greatly with its 
foreign policy in general as it seeks to promote human rights, to spread democracy 
and to maintain peace and stability in the African continent.  James Barber indicated 
that four things motivated South Africa’s African policy: 
• The obligation to repay a debt to those who supported and suffered in the 
liberation struggle. 
• To seek opportunities for revival and the African Renaissance. 
• To seek to employ its moral authority.  
• A belief in a stable and prosperous continent that serves its own interests.67  
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This came with the realisation that South Africa is part of the African continent and 
the problems of the continent will affect South Africa as well.  It could not escape the 
challenges that the continent was facing.  Also, as a country that was helped by the 
African continent to reach a negotiated settlement, there was a need to re-invest into 
the continent. 
Southern Africa featured at the heart of South Africa’s foreign policy.  The policy 
towards the region does not differ from the African policy in general.  In his attempts 
to indicate his government policy towards Southern Africa, Mandela visited 
Mozambique and Namibia in 1994.  These visits were to strengthen ties and to 
indicate Pretoria’s commitment to the Southern African region.   
3.4 Security challenges to South African foreign policy: The quest to 
maintain regional stability 
South Africa joined the region that has been plagued by a variety of security threats.  
Security in this paper will be used in a more broader sense to include human 
security, and not in a realist way of defining security in a militaristic sense.  The 
realists associate the concept of security with military and the protection of a state.  
This paper will look at other things that impact on security issues.   
When the Berlin wall crumbled, which symbolised the end of the cold war, the 
definition of security changed, with scholars arguing that security threats of the 20th 
century included other issues like human security, water security, food security, 
health and military.  The new definition included political, economic, social, cultural 
and personal security.  This new paradigm came with the realisation that post cold 
war conflicts were more intrastate conflicts as compared to interstate conflicts.  Such 
conflicts had plagued the South African region, mostly after the cold war ended.    
These security threats range from the tensions between different political parties in 
the country, the flight of refugees, disease, food security and environmental 
degradation.  One thing which must be noted about refugees is that they can also be 
a burden to the hosting countries, and they have the potential of bringing diseases 
which they contacted while running away from their country of origin.  Combating 
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such threats in the region would require Pretoria to act constructively in dealing with 
the causes of such threats since this would indicate success in South Africa’s foreign 
policy goals.   
The White Paper on Defence in a Democracy states that a common approach to 
security in South Africa is necessary for a number of reasons.  Firstly, many of the 
domestic threats to individual states are shared problems and impact negatively on 
the stability of neighbouring states.  Secondly, it is possible that interstate disputes 
could emerge in relation to refugees, trade, foreign investment, natural resources and 
previously suppressed territorial claims.  Thirdly, since the subcontinent is politically 
volatile and its national and regional institutions are relatively weak, internal conflicts 
could give rise to cross-border tensions and hostilities.68  This weakness also makes 
the region vulnerable to foreign interference and intervention from land, sea and air.    
These security challenges posed a challenge to Pretoria if it was serious about 
achieving its foreign policy objectives in the region.  Security challenges from the 
DRC, Angola and Lesotho were also of concern to Pretoria.69  The tensions that 
plagued these countries caused SADC to be regarded as the most war prone region 
in the world.  On joining SADC on the 3rd of August 1994, South Africa was given the 
difficult task of attracting investors into the region; difficult to achieve in a region that 
was plagued by security threats.  Investors were less likely to invest in a region that 
was facing security challenges.  This left Pretoria in a situation where it had to 
maintain security in the region in order to fulfil its task. 
South Africa expected to play a pivotal role since it was seen as hegemony in the 
Southern Africa region.  Its hegemonic image was, however, rejected by countries in 
the region that were sceptical of South Africa’s actions. The government of former 
president Nelson Mandela, realising this rejection, refrained from declaring the 
country a hegemony in the region.  However, judging from its economic and political 
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strength, it was obvious that South Africa was a hegemony in the region.  As a 
regional hegemony, South Africa had to maintain peace in the region.  Thus the 
government indicated that the Southern African region was the priority in its foreign 
policy and the maintenance of peace was its objective.  The late Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Alfred Nzo, noted that: 
“South Africa’s main objective is to play a constructive role in bringing about 
peace and stability in the region.  We are totally committed to the utilisation of 
preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping, through the use of 
regional and multilateral mechanisms”.70 
The battle to preserve peace in the region would be difficult to achieve unless South 
Africa was prepared to aid those countries experiencing a lack of economic growth.  
It was clear that the region was experiencing security challenges that would require 
Pretoria to respond with economic aid.  Countries such as Mozambique, the DRC 
and Lesotho rely on economic aid from South Africa if they are to minimise the 
security challenges they are facing.  It is in South Africa’s interest to see peace being 
maintained in these countries.  Most countries in the region are experiencing internal 
conflicts because of the scarce resources.   
In 1994 Lesotho experienced a political turmoil because the political parties were 
fighting for access to state resources.  The tensions had been caused by the 
election; however, when looking at the elections themselves it is clear that they were 
fighting for access to state resources.  The Basotho National party felt they had been 
cut off from the state resources that they had enjoyed for a long period of time.  In 
this context it would have been a positive move for South Africa to help Lesotho 
economically.   
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3.5 The formulation of Lesotho’s policy: The test for regional 
hegemony 
Lesotho provided a particular test of South Africa’s efforts to maintain security in the 
region.  This was because Lesotho was within South Africa’s borders and also 
because of the history between the ANC government and Lesotho.  During the 
apartheid era, most ANC refugees went to Lesotho to seek political asylum.  They 
were well fed by the then Lesotho government.  This kind of engagement forms the 
basis for South Africa’s relations with Lesotho.  In order to understand Pretoria’s 
policy towards Lesotho it would be vital to look at the 1994 crisis in Lesotho and how 
South Africa responded to that crisis.  This will help one contextualise Pretoria’s 
policy towards the kingdom. 
The process of democracy in Lesotho, as indicated in the previous chapter, started in 
1993 with the hosting of elections.  These elections announced the BCP as the 
winner with a landslide victory.  The government was incapable of ruling properly 
since it did not get the support of the civil servants.   
The lack of support caused the government to experience difficulties in ruling 
properly.71  
3.6 The causes of the tensions 
The political turmoil that plagued Lesotho followed the election results of 1994.  The 
opposition parties were not happy with the results and were willing to challenge the 
government.  However, they did not have an appropriate platform on which to base 
their claims since the elections were declared free and fair by domestic and 
international election observers.   
Certain events took place in the country that gave them the opportunity to protest 
against the BCP led government.  Firstly, the soldiers launched a demonstration 
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demanding that their wages be increased.72  Once their demands were met, the 
Royal Mounted Police also decided to demand an increase in their wages.  Their 
demonstration led to an increase in corruption, crime and lawlessness in the 
country.73  Secondly, the king wanted his father, King Moshoeshoe II be reinstated in 
power.  The military government of Lekhanya in 1991 exiled him after they realised 
that he was involved in the politics of the country.  Lastly, the lack of support the 
government received from the civil servants also gave the opposition parties the 
opportunity to demonstrate against the government.   
The opposition parties then marched to the palace, demanding that the king dissolve 
the government since it was incapable of ruling the country.  The BNP had the 
support of the king, chiefs and most people who were loyal to the king.  Furthermore, 
the military was also loyal to the king and was willing to follow his orders.   
This complicated the situation because it meant that the government was left with the 
police as its main security umbrella, since the military was no longer loyal.  Thus 
when in August the king unconstitutionally suspended the parliament and elected a 
new interim council headed by justice to rule over the country,74 the military 
contributed by being loyal to the king.    
The king’s actions were followed by a period of strikes from the followers of the 
government.  Most supporters of the government indicated that they were not happy 
with the king’s actions.75  The pro government demonstrators went to the palace 
demanding to talk to the king.  They fought with the republican guard who were 
protecting the palace.  During this confrontation four people, all of which were 
government supporters, were killed by the security forces.76  The king went on to ban 
all public meetings and sent the troops to take the prime minister’s equipment and 
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also the cabinet’s equipment.77  The king’s spokesperson noted that His Majesty 
dismissed the constitution because prime minister Ntsu Mokhehle was becoming 
dictatorial.   
These reports did not reflect what was happening on the ground.  The prime minister 
was not in a position to become a dictator since he was not given the proper support 
of the civil servants to attempt such a role.  Being a dictator would have required the 
government to have the full support of the military, something that he did not enjoy.  It 
was, however, required for the king’s spokesperson to shield his Majesty. 
3.7 South Africa’s response to the crisis in Lesotho  
The 1994 crisis in Lesotho happened at a time when South Africa was trying to 
consolidate her democracy.  It was the time when the ANC government was part of 
the region and was prepared to play an active role in the region.  The stability of the 
region was of crucial concern to the new South African government as part of their 
strategy to attract investors and to spread democracy in the region.  Any instability 
would have had an impact on the Southern African region as whole.  Lesotho, which 
was geographically in South Africa, posed a threat to South Africa and to the region 
as a whole.  The then president of South Africa Nelson Mandela noted that: 
“Current developments in Lesotho are of major concern to us.  Needless to 
say, these developments have a bearing on the stability in our own country, 
and they do have an impact on the principled question of democracy in 
Southern Africa”.78 
Mandela, recognising the impact the crisis would have in the region, decided to hold 
talks with the Zimbabwean president, Robert Mugabe, who happened to be in South 
Africa on a state visit for four days.  The two presidents indicated that they would 
prefer a negotiated settlement in Lesotho.  However, the use of the military was not 
totally ruled out as the two presidents indicated that the outcome of such would 
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determine future engagements.   These two presidents were currently playing an 
important role in the region, with South Africa being a hegemony due to its economic 
strength and Zimbabwe also being a dominant country in the region.   
They met with the king and gave him a week to restore the democratically elected 
government of Ntsu Mokhehle.  The problem was not solved at that stage.  It still 
needed more consultation with diplomats from Botswana, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe.  The foreign ministers from these three countries then called upon King 
Letsie III to attend a meeting with Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle in Pretoria.  The 
outcome of this meeting seemed to be a success as the three foreign ministers 
stated that: 
“We are happy the situation in Lesotho shows signs of hope.  The king has 
indicated to us that he will act to preserve the peace, stability, unity and 
understanding of the people of Lesotho”.79 
Throughout the negotiations Mandela was adamant that the democratically elected 
government of Mokhehle should be reinstated.  This commitment seemed to be 
influenced by his foreign policy goals of promoting democracy in the region.  The 
government of Ntsu Mokhehle was reinstated; however, the causes of the tensions in 
Lesotho were not solved.  Mandela was only concerned with restoring the 
democratically elected government without looking at the causes of the tensions.   
Thus the government was restored and had to govern in a hostile environment.  The 
electoral system used was still in place and was still to be used in the next election.  
This model caused more tension which needed the intervention of the SADC Troika 
again.  In this intervention the issue of the electoral model had to be solved or the 
tensions would continue.  These issues will be explored in detail in the next chapter.   
3.8 Conclusion 
The new South African government came into power when the region was 
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experiencing political insecurity.  This prompted the government to move quickly to 
do away with the apartheid foreign policy of destabilising neighbouring countries.  
The focus of the new South African government was with the Southern African 
region.  This had something to do with the role the region played during the apartheid 
era.  Nevertheless, the challenge for the new government was to develop a coherent 
foreign policy which would help it deal with security issues in Africa and also attract 
investors from the West.   
The Lesotho crisis presented South Africa with the first challenge of her new foreign 
policy.  The crisis that emerged in 1994 saw Mandela cooperating with neighbouring 
countries towards solving the crisis in Lesotho.  South Africa could not isolate itself 
from the security challenges that were prevalent in the region.  However, these 
challenges required South Africa to work with other countries in the region and not to 
go it alone.   
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Chapter 4 
4 South Africa’s multilateral approach to Lesotho’s crisis 
“South Africa’s main objective is to play a constructive role in bringing about peace 
and stability in the region.  We are totally committed to the utilisation of preventive 
diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping, through the use of regional and 
multilateral mechanisms”.80 
4.1 Introduction 
Southern Africa is a region that has witnessed deadly conflict caused by civil wars 
and political instability.  Towards the turn of the century, the region was regarded as 
the most war torn region.  Unfortunately the United Nations was incapable of solving 
the civil wars that were experienced in the region.  Instead, the role of conflict 
resolution in Africa was given to regional organisations.   
The United States was also not willing to participate in conflict resolution in Africa.  
This is because of the bad performance of their troops in Somalia in 1992.  Europe 
was occupied with the Balkan crisis and had no time to focus on conflicts in Africa.  
Also, after the end of the cold war, Africa could no longer offer the West and East 
strategic support.  Therefore solving conflicts in Africa had to depend on Africans 
themselves.  In this context, South Africa was seen as the one country in the region 
that could play a pivotal role in conflict resolution in the 1998 political crisis in 
Lesotho. 
Southern Africa faced few conflicts that affected stability in the region.  In 1997, rebel 
leader, Laurent Kabila, overthrew Sese Seko Mobutu, the then Zairian leader.  
Mandela attempted to get the two leaders to negotiate but his attempts failed.  Much 
was expected from Kabila’s government; i.e. that it would solve the political crisis that 
plagued the country ever since independence.  However, this did not materialise as 
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the rebels, who were supported by Rwanda and Uganda, were fighting against 
Kabila’s government.  Also, the decade long civil war in Angola was a serious 
concern to the stability of the region.  These conflicts exacerbated the lack of security 
in the Southern African region, thereby posing a threat to South Africa’s foreign 
policy. 
Lesotho in 1998 also contributed to insecurity in the region because of tension 
between different political parties.  This tension followed the announcement of the 
election results, which indicated that the LCD had won.  The opposition parties were 
not willing to be led by a government they thought had lost the elections.  This 
created security problems that needed external intervention since the parties at home 
could not solve them.  The United Nations was not in a position to send its 
peacekeeping forces since it expected regional organisations, in this case SADC, to 
solve the problems.  Also, a popular dictum; i.e. “African solutions to an African 
problem” was used as justification for not taking part in conflict resolution activities in 
Africa.    
South Africa, along with Zimbabwe and Botswana, were then tasked with the burden 
of solving the crisis in Lesotho.  This task started in 1994 when the king dissolved the 
constitution after the government of Ntsu Mokhehle for been unable to govern.  This 
kind of involvement continued until the elections of 1998.  During these elections, 
South Africa, together with Botswana, sent troops to Lesotho in an operation that was 
known as Operation Boleas.   
The main objective of this operation was to restore peace and democracy in the 
country.  Although the two counties were decisive in bringing about peace in Lesotho, 
they did not managed to reconcile the nation and therefore, the tensions were still 
intact.  South Africa’s intervention in Lesotho was guided by its foreign policy 
commitment of maintaining peace in the region.  This intervention was crucial to 
Pretoria as part of contributing to peace in the region.   
The maintenance of peace in the region is vital to South Africa in order to attract 
investors and also as part of fulfilling its foreign policy goals of spreading human 
rights and democracy in the region.  The focus of this chapter will be on South 
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Africa’s strategy of promoting peace in Lesotho and settling the disputes peacefully.  
The chapter will answer the following research questions:  What were Pretoria’s 
objectives within the SADC Troika?  Why did South Africa choose to go to Lesotho 
while it refused to go to the DRC?  Why did Pretoria change its strategy from military 
intervention in Lesotho during September 1998 to one of peacemaking after the 
intervention until the elections in 2002?  Was military intervention inevitable?  Was 
the intervention beneficial to the people of Lesotho and did South Africa leave a 
coherent conflict resolution plan that the Basotho people could use when South 
Africa had left? 
The chapter will also examine South Africa’s negotiation efforts in Lesotho after the 
intervention.  These post intervention efforts were decisive in helping the country to 
host the elections in 2002. 
4.2 The period before the 1998 elections in Lesotho 
Before the elections, the government of the Basotho Congress Party was 
experiencing internal difficulties with some factions within the party no longer happy 
with the leadership of Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle.  This led to a split that saw the 
prime minister moving away with a faction that he called the Lesotho Congress for 
Democracy (LCD).81  This party had the majority in the parliament and therefore 
continued to rule.  The Basotho Congress Party (BCP) was then relegated to the 
ranks of opposition.  This caused the opposition parties to assume that they would 
win the elections since the ruling party was still trying to establish itself in Lesotho.  
By joining the opposition, the BCP increased tensions towards the government.  Most 
opposition parties were happy with the split because they thought it had affected the 
LCD and might have an impact on the elections to be held in a year’s time.   
The date for the second democratic elections in Lesotho was to be announced.  
However, before it was announced, different political parties were holding meetings 
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to rally support for themselves.  The Basotho National Party (BNP) held its meetings 
at a place called Mmanthabiseng; the Basotho Congress Party at Hasofo, and the 
LPP at Lepereng.82  During these meetings the BNP had the most number of people 
attending.   
However, sources within the government informed the researcher that the majority of 
the people who attended the BNP meeting were young people, some of whom were 
not qualified to vote.  This was going to have an impact on the polls themselves.  The 
BNP did not consider the age disadvantage of the people who came to the meeting; 
the numbers gave them an impression that they were going to win the elections.  
Because Lesotho is a small country, it was easy for some members of these different 
political parties to witness the attendance of other political parties.   
The BNP was convinced that they would win because their meetings attracted large 
crowds.  Furthermore, the split within the BNP gave the them the impression that the 
LCD would not be properly prepared to contest the elections, which were only a few 
months away.   
When the results indicated that the BNP had lost, tensions emerged.  Pretoria tried to 
solve the tension through peaceful means, and when these did not prove fruitful, it 
went for military intervention together with Botswana.  They intervened in an attempt 
to solve the tension that plagued the small mountain kingdom.  The military 
intervention in Lesotho has been heavily documented, but the diplomatic intervention 
before the military intervention did not receive much attention. 
4.3 The 1998 elections in Lesotho:  The Lesotho Congress Party in an 
unconvincing victory 
Elections in Lesotho were held on 13th May 1998, and the LCD won all 79 seats 
except one.  Domestic and international observers declared them to be free and fair.  
The announcement of the elections left the opposition parties complaining that the 
elections had been rigged.  This was the sort of controversy that has plagued the 
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elections in Lesotho since independence.  The Westminster model, as indicated 
elsewhere in this thesis, was not properly implemented to function in concert with the 
monarchical system.  It always produced tension between the opposition parties and 
the government.  It always left the opposition parties feeling that the elections had 
been rigged.  The winning party was most likely to win with a big margin.  Even 
though parties looked balanced before the elections, the results produced were 
always controversial.   
The BCP, BNP, MTFP and other opposition parties were not prepared to accept the 
election results.  They formed an alliance to contest the results, and as time went on 
other smaller parties decided to join them in protesting the results of the elections.83 
They went to the palace and demanded the king dismiss the government as he did in 
1994.  Demonstrators stayed at the palace and did not come back within the 
timeframe given to them to disperse. 84  The soldiers at the palace did not dismiss 
them, and this gave the government the impression that the soldiers were on the side 
of the demonstrators.  Their stay at the palace also encouraged the LCD supporters 
who also wanted to confront the demonstrators.  This could have worsened the 
tension that already existed.  The soldiers who were guarding the palace prevented 
this from happening by not allowing the LCD supporters to gain access. 
According to Mamello Morison, an official within the opposition, demonstrations at the 
palace were peaceful.  However, certain sources within the police indicated that there 
were sporadic gun fights between the demonstrators and the police.  Although this 
was the case, two things should be noted: firstly their stay at the palace was illegal 
since they stayed even when the time allocated to them had expired, and secondly, 
the military contributed to the crisis by not dispersing them.   
As the demonstrators continued to stay at the palace, the situation in the country was 
deteriorating and South Africa in this context felt that the tension might spill over to 
the Orange Free State (OFS) province.  This was because of the possibility of 
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Basotho refugees running to the OFS province and inviting attack.  Mandela’s 
government decided to mediate in an attempt to encourage a negotiated settlement.   
 50 
4.4 South Africa’s diplomatic efforts before the military intervention: 
Worthy attempts lacked proper execution  
South Africa felt the need to deal with the crisis in Lesotho since it might have serious 
implications for her own political situation at home.  The refugees who might flee to 
the OFS might need support from the government, which would be costly for the 
government.  Also, their plight might affect the Basothos who were working in the 
mines in South Africa.  Thus Pretoria’s response was to prevent the crisis from 
spilling over to the OFS.  The first response to the crisis was diplomatic.  This was 
part of the foreign policy objective that South Africa was committed to, namely 
peaceful resolution of conflicts in Africa and elsewhere in the world.    
SADC diplomats, led by the then South African safety and security minister Sydney 
Mafumadi, went to Lesotho in August 1998 to encourage a negotiated settlement.  
This team had to try and convince the government and the opposition parties to 
negotiate.  Pretoria’s strategy was applauded by many scholars.  However, for these 
negotiations to be successful, South Africa needed to solve the tensions that had 
evolved, and also encourage the creation of a new electoral model that would 
incorporate all the parties in the country. 
The opposition parties would only negotiate if the issue of the elections was solved, 
since it was the root cause of the tensions in the country.  Following these claims, the 
South African government decided to appoint a commission led by Judge Pius Langa 
to investigate whether there were irregularities during the elections.  Prime minister 
Phakhathi Mosisili gave a statement that:  
“If the commission proves that the elections consisted [of] elements of fraud 
he will resign”.85  
This statement was confusing because it meant that the commission could report 
anything; as long as the word “fraud” did not appear, the prime minister would not 
resign.  It also put the commission in a situation where they needed to decide 
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whether or not to use the word.  The word itself was loaded with huge political 
ramifications.  The commission had to decide on the kind of words to use to define 
the results of the elections. 
The commission completed their investigation and when it was finished, the report 
was handed over to the then deputy president Thabo Mbeki, who was to present it to 
the various parties in Lesotho.  He did not present it as required; instead he indicated 
that it would be presented at the SADC summit in Mauritius.  The refusal to present 
the report caused the opposition parties to start losing faith in South Africa’s efforts to 
negotiate a settlement of the tension in Lesotho.   
Two explanations were given to explain Mbeki’s refusal to hand in the report to the 
authorities in Lesotho:  On the one hand, there was information that the report was 
“explosive” and could not be released because it could worsen the tensions in the 
country.  On the other hand, Botswana and Zimbabwe stopped Mbeki from 
presenting the report, and instead suggested that it should be presented at the 
summit in Mauritius.86  The opposition parties were convinced that Mbeki did not 
present the report because the contents were highly explosive.  This could have 
been the case since the Troika could not have stopped him from presenting the 
report if there were no problems with it.  Unfortunately, the opposition could not be 
allowed to be part of the SADC summit since only government representatives were 
welcomed.87  This also caused the opposition parties to lose faith in South Africa's 
mediation efforts.  The report itself would have changed the situation in the country.  
The government might have been forced to set another date for the elections. 
The government of Lesotho was told that it could be present when the report was to 
be presented at the SADC summit in Mauritius.  Instead of being presented at the 
summit, the then president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, refused, and said the 
report could not be presented at a summit level; it should be presented before the 
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authorities in Lesotho.88  South Africa’s refusal to present the report caused the 
opposition parties to complain, stating that they did not approve of the delay.  During 
the delay there were suggestions that the report had been doctored.89  The Basotho 
people were growing impatient with the delay and were becoming more critical of 
South Africa’s unwillingness to present the report.  South Africa was applying a 
delaying tactic to prepare the Basotho people to accept the findings of the 
commission. 
The report could not be delayed for much longer, as the Basothos were getting 
impatient.  Thus, Mafumadi finally presented the report on the 17th of September.90  It 
did not exclude the possibility of irregularities during the elections, and one of its 
findings reported that about 95% of the sealed white bags in which the ballot papers 
were kept, had been unsealed and attempts were made to reseal them.91  Despite 
these irregularities, the report concluded that the will of the people was reflected in 
the polls.  This was said in order to avoid further political conflicts erupting in the 
country.  If there were indications that the bags were unsealed and resealed later 
then the ballots must have been tampered with and therefore the results did not 
necessary reflect the will of the people.   
Also, the commission avoided the use of the word “fraud” as it could have meant the 
prime minister would need to resign from office.  South Africa could not afford to see 
the government of Pakhathi Mosisili resigning as it is regarded him as democratically 
elected.  This indicates that the commission itself was not credible in delivering a 
reliable report, which would have been trusted by both the opposition parties and the 
government.  It was only favourable to the government and not the opposition 
parties. 
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The situation went out of control and diminished the government’s capability to rule.  
The country was ungovernable.  South Africa’s efforts to arrange for a negotiated 
settlement lacked proper vision.  It was clear that the situation could have escalated 
as the Mandela government was not doing enough as a regional hegemony to help 
suppress the tensions in Lesotho.  The failure is attributed to the fact that South 
Africa, as a hegemony, was not prepared to commit its finances to the crisis in the 
country and was also not able to command proper support from the region to 
maintain the operation. 
Instead, South Africa blundered by not handing over the Langa report to the 
authorities in Lesotho.  The then deputy president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, 
went to Lesotho and refused to present the report.  It was unfortunate that he flew to 
Lesotho and then refused to hand over the report to the authorities.  Furthermore, 
Nelson Mandela, as chair of SADC, did the people a disfavour by not allowing the 
report to be presented during the summit, which contradicted the statement made by 
his deputy Thabo Mbeki that the report would be presented during the summit in 
Mauritius.  This also angered the opposition parties who thought the president was 
buying time.  They thought he wanted to change the content of the report first.  The 
opposition parties’ willingness to debate was hammered by Pretoria’s failure to 
handle the Langa report correctly.  This led to the breakdown of the negotiations 
process and the beginning of the crisis.  Demonstrations increased and the 
opposition parties were no longer willing to negotiate. 
4.5 Operation Boleas: South Africa resorts to military action 
The process of negotiations was exhausted and had not produced results.  Instead it 
seemed as if the outcome of the negotiations dismayed South Africa.  The Mandela 
government’s strategy to negotiate seemed fruitless at that point.  The attempts to 
negotiate were good; however they lacked the proper execution strategy.  There was 
therefore a need to intervene militarily to quell the demonstrations.  It should be 
noted that the military intervention was the last option and came as a result of 
Pretoria’s failure to diplomatically manage the negotiations.  As noted below by the 
ANC Daily News: 
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“The military intervention follows unsuccessful attempts by a South African 
Development Community team to mediate a negotiated settlement to a crisis 
sparked by opposition party claims that the Lesotho’s May 23 elections were 
rigged”.92 
The followers of the opposition parties, led by the BNP, BCP and the Marematlou 
Freedom Party (MTFP), confiscated government vehicles, rendering it difficult to 
govern the country.  They received news that SADC might intervene in their country.  
This led their leaders to mobilise support in the townships to counteract the possible 
intervention by South Africa.  More stay aways were organised and the civil servants 
did not report to work.  The government was no longer in control of the country.  It 
looked like the opposition parties were leading a coup.   
The prime minister and some government officials were no longer in control of the 
country.  Instead they were living in fear that the demonstrators might attack them.93 
This prompted the prime minister to write a letter calling for SADC to intervene.  He 
then wrote a letter to SADC requesting military assistance to solve the tensions that 
were rendering the country difficult to rule.  In a letter written to a regional head of 
state for military assistance he stated: 
“In my capacity as Prime Minister and head of the government of the 
kingdom of Lesotho, I wish to urgently request your excellencies, heads of 
states of Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe, to come to 
the rescue of the government and the people of Lesotho”.94 
He further said: 
“I will appreciate your excellencies’ timely intervention before it is too late”.95 
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This request came after a calculated decision by the prime minister that his life and 
the lives of his fellow government officials were in danger.  However, it must be 
recognised at this point that although the prime minister called upon SADC to 
intervene because he felt insecure, he should, however, have consulted the king first.  
The constitution of Lesotho requires the prime minister to inform the king about the 
happenings in the country.  It states that: 
“The King shall have the right to be consulted by the Prime Minister and the 
other ministers on all matters relating to the government of Lesotho and the 
Prime Minister shall keep him fully informed concerning the general conduct 
of the government of Lesotho and shall furnish him with such information as 
he may request in respect of any particular matter relating to the 
government.96 
The South African military, later joined by Botswana, went to Lesotho on the 22nd of 
September in what has popularly been called Operation Boleas.  Mangosuthu 
Buthelezi, who was acting president while Mandela was away in the United States 
(deputy president Thabo Mbeki was also away in Finland and foreign minister Alfred 
Nzo and his deputy Aziz Pahad were at the United Nations), authorised the 
intervention in Lesotho. 
This operation happened at a time when the SADC region was divided.  The conflict 
in the DRC occupied the attention of most SADC states.  The then DRC president 
Laurent Kabila called upon a few countries, including South Africa, to help him fight 
the rebels.  Mandela refused to intervene, citing that he preferred a negotiated 
settlement.  Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia responded to the call.97  The response of 
the three countries was seen as a defiance of South Africa’s hegemonic status in the 
region.  The intervention in Lesotho left many scholars arguing that South Africa did 
not have a coherent foreign policy.  They saw Pretoria as contradicting its own 
foreign policy by refusing to intervene in the DRC where they have been legitimately 
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invited to intervene, but involving themselves in Lesotho where their invitation did not 
meet constitutional requirements.     
Furthermore, the intervention itself came at a time when South Africa was 
restructuring her military forces.  Forces from Umkhonto we Sizwe and the Pan 
Africanist Movement had been incorporated into the South African Defence Force.  
The combined military force was called South African National Defence Force.  They 
were not in a position to undertake any peacekeeping operations.  However, the LCD 
government was happy with the SADC intervention.  They regarded it as a timeous 
intervention; if it had been delayed for a few weeks then the situation could have 
been far worse.   
The intervention was not without its mistakes.  Firstly, there was not sufficient time to 
call upon the SADC Organ of Defence, and the security services did not have the 
time to discuss the situation in Lesotho.98  Article 5 of the protocol on defence and 
security, signed in 1996, states that intervention in a foreign state can take place 
where there is large-scale violence between sections of the population, if there is a 
threat to the legitimate authority of the government, or if there is any crisis that could 
threaten the peace and security of the region.99  The intervention itself was not 
properly executed.  The conditions laid down in the protocol were prevalent in 
Lesotho, and this was because the Zimbabwean president, Robert Mugabe, was not 
available and the Mozambican president, Joachim Chissano, was away in Brazil.  
The intervention was then more of a consultation between Botswana and South 
Africa. 
Secondly, the South African troops were told not to expect any form of resistance.100 
This made them relaxed, hoping that the mission will be easily executed.  Things did 
not turn out that way.  What was supposed to be a peacemaking operation now 
turned out to be a fight between the SANDF and Lesotho’s Mounted Forces.  The 
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intervening forces were met with looting at Maseru, Mafekeng and other parts of 
Lesotho.  They had to fight troops at the Makonyane Barracks, and that led to the 
killing of a few soldiers.101 
The intervention itself managed to get the police and the military forces to comply 
with the government.  However, the country was still divided.  Opposition parties 
were still not willing to comply with the government of Phakhathi Mosisili.  Instead, 
they wanted a government of National Unity, which would be representative of all the 
parties in Lesotho.  The prime minister was not willing to give in to the opposition’s 
demands.  This fuelled tension between the government and the opposition.  Also, it 
was not a calculated move by South Africa to go to Lesotho to reinstate a 
government, which was regarded by the opposition to have won the election only by 
cheating.  This only served to create a sense of hatred towards South Africa.  While 
these sentiments were growing, the South African government was happy to have 
ended the demonstration which led to the beginning of peace in the mountain 
kingdom.   As the then minister of foreign affairs noted: 
"South Africa is proud to have played its part, as a member of SADC, in 
successfully restoring peace and stability to Lesotho.  The prosperity of 
Southern Africa is one of our utmost priorities and having struggled for so 
long to establish democracy at home we could not ignore our closest 
neighbour's call when its democracy was under threat.”102 
One crucial thing was still missing; the reconciliation between the opposition and the 
government.  This was something South Africa was not capable of effecting.  The 
possibilities for conflict were still there.  Thus Mandela decided to increase the 
number of SANDF troops in Maseru to deal with potential threats that might occur.  
The sending of more troops was aimed at quelling the armed forces and to give the 
opposing parties a chance to negotiate the future of the country. 
4.6 The post intervention engagements: Paving the way for a 
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negotiated settlement 
The military intervention was not as effective as it was expected to be.  The SANDF’s 
efforts were not followed by proper policy guidelines.  However, it should be noted 
that the operation was successful in getting the LDF to return to their bases, and the 
country experienced a relative time of peace.  Promoting peace in Lesotho was one 
objective the SANDF was not in a position to achieve.  Nevertheless, one thing that 
the foreign troops celebrated was that they managed to calm the tensions that had 
plagued Lesotho since the release of the elections results.  They did not realise that 
the root cause of the tension in Lesotho was not the conflicting parties as such, but 
the electoral model used.  The intervening parties did not solve this problem.103  In 
December the government and the opposition parties finally met to discuss the future 
of Lesotho.  They came to an agreement on the electoral issues in the country.  The 
agreement included four important stipulations: 
• The parties agreed to hold new elections within a timeframe of 15-18 months. 
• The parties agreed on the restructuring of the Independent Electoral Commission 
to ensure it was able to effectively discharge its mandate. 
• They agreed to formulate a code of conduct for political parties, which would 
ensure inter alia the creation of a climate conducive for free political activity and 
further agreed to immediately desist from making inflammatory statements.   
• Lastly, they agreed to work together to restore stability in the country and desist 
from actions that could compromise the professionalism of the security forces.      
Credit should be given to the LCD government for agreeing on a date for the new 
elections; even if their term in office was over.  This indicated their initial willingness 
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to solve the problems affecting Lesotho.  Also, it indicated that they were still 
confident that even if a new election was held, they could still win. 
South Africa then came with a CODESA style idea to get the government and the 
opposition parties to negotiate.  The government and opposition parties then came to 
an agreement that a structure would be put into place which would make 
preparations for the elections in Lesotho, and this structure would also seek to 
promote conditions conducive to the holding of free and fair elections.104  The 
agreement reached had the following critical outcomes: it led to the creation of the 
Interim Political Authority (IPA), a body that was to pave the way for the hosting of 
the next election in eighteen months consisting of two members from each party in 
Lesotho.  This did not mean that it had powers like the government had; it was only 
an inclusive body that was created to pave a way for the hosting of elections. 
As highlighted elsewhere in this report the problem with Lesotho’s tensions was with 
the electoral system used.  The Westminster model needed to be amended or 
changed for the tensions to end.  For democracy in Lesotho to last, there was a need 
to change the electoral system.  With the creation of the IPA it was hoped that the 
problem would be solved.  However, this problem was not properly solved; it was 
partially solved with the government signing an agreement with the IPA.  The 
agreement listed a few stipulations, one of which was that a new member ratio would 
be included in the system to be used.   
As indicated in the agreement, the parties unreservedly accepted the award of the 
Arbitration Tribunal appointment in terms of Section 16 of the Interim Political 
Authority Act 1998 on the electoral model to be adopted for the forthcoming and 
subsequent elections.  According to the award delivered on 15 October 1999, for the 
2000 election only, the mix ratio of constituency seats (FPTP) to Proportional 
Representation (PR) would be 80/40.  Thereafter the mix ratio of FPTP and PR 
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would be 50% each for the seats in the National Assembly.105 
This agreement did not solve the problems.  One cannot go through the new system 
in great detail but it should be noted that it also included some elements of the 
Westminster First-Past-The-Post system.  The 80% ratio, which was given to the PR 
system, meant that the party that could win all those seats would automatically form 
the government, and the other parties would have to share the remaining 40%..106 
During this period South Africa was not playing her part well as a peacemaker.  
Firstly, the members of the IPA were going to be paid for taking part in the body.  The 
government of Lesotho did not have funds to finance it.  South Africa did not come up 
with any substantial funds to help in the running of the IPA.  Part of the reason that 
the LCD government was not capable of financing the IPA was because it had to pay 
South Africa back for the military intervention.   
The agreement between the government of Lesotho and the government of South 
Africa noted that the receiving party would be liable to the sending party for all real 
expenses and costs incurred by the sending party, with regard to the provision of 
military assistance to the receiving party.  Upon receipt of an account from the 
sending party, the receiving party would have to pay the expenses and costs within a 
period of 30 days.  Interim accounts could be lodged by the sending party, and upon 
conclusion of the military assistance, a final account would be lodged.107 
The poor mountain kingdom had to settle the amount as indicated in the agreement.  
The country was in more in need of funds than South Africa, yet ended up having to 
pay its dominant neighbour.  This left many scholars saying South Africa was bullying 
its way in Lesotho by making the country pay for the debt.  One can also argue that 
the intervention by the South African Defence force crippled the poor mountain 
kingdom of Lesotho.  The country was faced with the economic burden of 
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restructuring the economic infrastructure destroyed by the demonstrators when the 
SADC forces arrived in Lesotho and also having to settle the cost of military 
intervention. 
The economic problems Lesotho was facing could not be separated from the 
economic problems faced by other African countries at large.  Thus Thabo Mbeki, 
who became the president of South Africa in late 1999, came up with a vision of the 
Africa Recovery.  He introduced a new vision called the African Renaissance.  The 
political problems facing Lesotho could not be properly addressed without dealing 
with the economic problems.  The following chapter will examine Thabo Mbeki’s 
vision of the African Renaissance and how it will help Lesotho move out of the 
economic problem it was facing. 
4.7 Conclusion 
South Africa’s military intervention in Lesotho left many problems that needed to be 
solved.  Although the intervention seems to have been decisive in restoring peace 
and paved the way for negotiations, it was not decisive in reconciling the nation.  
Hostilities existed between the government and the opposition parties, and there was 
also no conflict resolution mechanism that could be used when the intervening forces 
had left.  This goes back to the poor planning of the intervention itself and also the 
lack of coordination between South Africa and Botswana. 
The negotiations prior to the elections were not successful.  The Langa commission 
was the proper vehicle Pretoria could have used to deal with the tensions in the 
country.  This commission was also not properly guided by the South African 
government.  Some scholars tend to congratulate Pretoria’s efforts to facilitate peace 
in Lesotho.  These scholars tend to focus on the intervention to stop the crisis from 
escalating.  Their analysis fails to account for South Africa’s role during the 
negotiation process.  It does not help one understand why tension still existed 
between the government and the parties in Lesotho.  One can therefore argue that 
the situation in Lesotho required South Africa’s active involvement, even during the 
negotiation phase.    
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Chapter 5 
5 African Renaissance: The test case 
“Those who have eyes let them see.  The African Renaissance is upon us, as we 
peer through the looking glass darkly, this may not be obvious.  But it is upon us.  
What we have been talking about is the establishment of genuine and stable 
democracies in Africa, in which the systems of governance will flourish because they 
derive their authority and legitimacy from the will of the people.108 
5.1 Introduction 
Towards the end of the millennium Lesotho was one country in the region that was 
not performing well economically.  The reason was that the tensions of 1998 had left 
the country with poor economic growth prospects and a poor business infrastructure.  
On the economic front, the tiny mountain kingdom was classified as one of the least 
developed countries.  On the political front, the country was still searching for a 
proper model to be used during the elections in 2002. 
These economic and political problems occurred at a time when there was a popular 
vision called the African Renaissance which was dominating debates in Africa.  This 
was known as the Renaissance era in Africa.  This vision was Thabo Mbeki’s who 
promoted the concept while he was still deputy president (since 1994).  He became 
the president of the Republic of South Africa in 1999.  His popular foreign policy 
vision of the African Renaissance was then expected to have an impact in his foreign 
policy, particularly during his term as president of South Africa.  The vision is Africa 
as a continent that will wake up and take control of her own affairs.  The political and 
economic problems in Lesotho were of great concern to South Africa during the 
Mbeki Renaissance era.  Solving these problems should be seen within the broader 
vision on the African Renaissance.   
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This chapter aims to investigate the probability of solving the Lesotho crisis within the 
African Renaissance vision.  It will examine the attempts by the Mbeki government to 
solve the problems in Lesotho.  It will also examine the bilateral relations South Africa 
signed with Lesotho as a basis for helping Lesotho to move from being a least 
developed nation. 
5.2 The African Renaissance 
The vision of an African Renaissance is not a policy but a dream that will come about 
in the future.  It is Thabo Mbeki’s dream of an African continent that is in the process 
of revival and re-awakening to take control of its own affairs.  He rightly specified 
that:  
“As all us know, the word “renaissance” means rebirth, renewal, springing up 
new.  Therefore, when we speak of an African Renaissance, we speak of the 
rebirth and renewal of our continent.109 
In this vision Mbeki is calling upon all African countries to participate in the renewal 
process.  He was quick to realise that African countries would not join if the 
Renaissance was a South African project; this is because of the general fear that 
South Africa might want to dominate the continent.  Mbeki indicated that there are 
certain conditions which should be met before the dream is realised.  These 
conditions are: 
• The establishment of democratic systems to ensure the accomplishment of the 
goal that the people shall govern. 
• Establishing the institution and procedures to enable the continent to deal 
collectively with questions of democracy, peace and stability. 
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• Achieving sustainable economic development that results in the continuous 
improvements of the living standard of the people. 
• Changing Africa’s place in the world economy to that of one free from debt, and 
no longer being a supplier of raw material and an importer of manufactured 
goods. 
• Ensuring the emancipation of women. 
• Confronting the HIV/AIDS pandemic. 
• Rediscovering Africa’s creative past, encouraging artistic creativity, and restoring 
popular involvement in accessing and advancing science and technology. 
• Lastly, strengthening the genuine independence of African countries and 
continent in their relations with major powers and enhancing their role in the 
determination of global systems of governance in all fields.110 
Some scholars have criticised the vision as an empty vision.  They argue that the 
proposed vision holds nothing for Africa; prominent are those who say South Africa 
should focus on its own economic affairs rather than on the continental recovery.  
Some go to the extent of arguing that South Africa should focus on its relationship 
with North America and Europe and let the African countries solve their own 
problems.  What seems to be lacking from these scholars is the realisation that South 
Africa’s destiny is intractably intertwined with that of Africa.  The country cannot 
prosper if the countries in the African continent are not prospering. 
Although highly criticised, the vision has two most important elements which are 
central to Africa; political stability and economic growth.  Before unpacking these 
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elements it is necessary for one to highlight the objectives of the Renaissance Africa.  
On the political front there should be democratisation and good governance in the 
continent, as the deputy president pointed out:   
“One of the main ingredients, however, has to be good political systems in all 
countries that uphold the principle of democratic at all costs.  We therefore 
we need conditions to promote good values and promote dignity of the 
people.  In the absence of these, it is easy to thwart development, intellectual 
thinking or any other forms of thinking.  It is therefore obvious that delaying 
the democratisation of Africa also delays the African Renaissance.”111 
On the economic front Mbeki foresees an African continent that will recover 
economically and take up its place in the global economy.  Mbeki argues that:   
“These economic objectives, which must result in the elimination of poverty, 
the establishment of modern multi-sector economies, and the growth of 
Africa’s share of world economic activity, are an essential part of the African 
Renaissance.”112 
Both the economic and political reforms should take place to pave the way for the 
realisation of the dream.  However, this does not mean South Africa has to be a big 
brother in steering the way to the African Renaissance; the country should be 
prepared to take part in peace missions on the African continent.  In these peace 
missions the military could be used for backup purposes.113 
The vision seemed to be incorporating the foreign policy vision Mbeki was promoting 
in Africa.  However, as indicated above, South Africa should work with other 
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countries if they were to be realised.  Also, it should be emphasised that the renewal 
of Africa was not to be achieved within a few years.  It needs time for the vision to 
come to reality.  The conflicts that are still prevalent on the continent have a direct 
impact on the renewal dream.  The tensions in Lesotho and the conflict in the DRC 
are amongst many conflicts that pose a threat to the renewal vision.  Addressing 
these problems falls within the African Renaissance vision.  This does not mean that 
other parts of the continent are not important in the Renaissance vision.  The two 
countries listed are important because they form part of the SADC region, which is a 
priority for Pretoria when it comes to foreign policy making.   
Since it is close to Pretoria, Lesotho poses a direct test for the renewal vision if it is to 
be realised.  The economic and political problems in this mountain kingdom need a 
response from South Africa.  Stability and economic growth form the pillars of the 
renewal project. 
5.3 The renewal project and the political tension in Lesotho 
Stability in the region is one element of the renewal vision that is critical and can 
have serious implications for the vision.  One can boldly argue that without political 
stability in Africa there will be no African Renaissance.  As professor Paul-Henri 
Bischoff puts it:  
“The need to achieve stability holds the key to a new Africa vision, as does 
the recognition that there have to be many ways of achieving stability”.114  
Furthermore, the deputy president also noted: 
“We will know that the African Renaissance has been achieved once war and 
destruction are a mere chapter of in our history, rather than a daily reality for 
many Africans.”115  
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It is against this background that the renewal of Africa contributes towards resolving 
conflicts in the continent.  However, it should be noted that resolving conflicts in 
African would not demand the military way since this will only exacerbate the conflict.  
There should be a peaceful way of resolving conflict with minimum usage of the 
military; mostly for logistics and technical support.  The political security and 
economic development of Lesotho pose a test of the South African ability to achieve 
the African Renaissance. 
The situation in Lesotho did not improve as the government and political parties were 
not on good terms.  There was still a lack of proper communication between the 
government and the opposition parties, and suspicions were still prevalent between 
the two parties.  Dealing with this tension required more involvement by the South 
African government.  This engagement would require South Africa to work 
constructively with the IPA since it was a forum where the opposition parties and the 
government could negotiating issues relating to the elections. 
5.4 South Africa and the Interim Political Authority  
The idea of a negotiating forum in Lesotho came from South Africa.  This was 
created to allow the opposition parties and the government to negotiate.  This forum, 
as indicated before, was created to deal with the issue of an electoral model and to 
facilitate and promote the preparations for holding new elections.116  The negotiations 
forum was called the Interim Political Authority (IPA).  The success of this forum 
would be an advantage to the African Renaissance vision.  The forum thus wanted to 
achieve the following:  
• To create and promote conditions conducive to the holding of free and fair 
elections. 
• To level the playing field for all political parties and candidates that want to 
participate in the elections. 
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• To eliminate any impediments to legitimate political activity. 
• To ensure that no person is victimised on account of his political beliefs. 
• To eliminate any form of intimidation that has a bearing on the election. 
• To ensure that all political parties and candidates are free to canvas support and 
voters, and to organise and hold meetings; and for that purpose to have access to 
all voters. 
• To eliminate political patronage of any kind. 
• To ensure equal treatment of all political parties and candidates by all government 
institutions, and in particular by all government-owned media, prior to and during 
the elections.117 
This act was binding and obligatory among participants.  Section 14 and 15 of this 
Act states that the executive, meaning the government, shall be obliged to implement 
all decisions of the Authority, and the decision of the Authority shall be binding on all 
parties and candidates who will participate in the next general elections.  These two 
clauses form the core of the authority.  If they are not implemented then the Authority 
could not survive. 
The parties in Lesotho met on December 3rd 1999 to map out an agreement on the 
recommendations of the IPA.  They agreed on the electoral model that was going to 
be used during the elections in December.  It was agreed that the mix ratio of 
constituency to Proportional Representation (PR) should be 80/50 and the mix ratio 
of the First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) and PR should be 50% each of seats in the 
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National Assembly.118  The IPA then submitted the model before the parliament as a 
Bill.  The National Assembly did not accept the Bill as it was.  Instead the government 
made some amendments to the Bill; this caused the opposition parties to lose hope 
in the government’s willingness to solve the crisis in the country.  The National 
Assembly’s act of amending the Bill had negative ramifications for the elections that 
were to be held in 2000.   
Within this confusion the Senate then intervened and restored the Bill to its original 
form.119  At this point it was expected that South Africa would intervene and mediate 
between the conflicting parties.  This did not materialise and the opposition parties 
were no longer happy about the negotiating forum. 
The amendments had serious implications for the political developments within the 
country.  The opposition parties were on the brink of leaving the forum.  This could 
have meant that the IPA, which had been established to facilitate and prepare the 
holding of elections in Lesotho, would be disbanded and the election issue dropped.  
Since the National Assembly always amended the IPA’s recommendations, it was 
inevitable that the negotiations might break down.  Also, the Bill proposed the 
appointment of a new electoral Commissioner, which was also delayed.120 
Consequently the election of 2000 had to be postponed.  The government and the 
opposition parties were locked in a stalemate.  The amendments which the 
government introduced meant that:  
• The envisaged elections would not take place. 
• The principle of inclusivity was severely undermined. 
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• The Mixed Member Parliament Electoral system would be dropped and the 
country would be presented with a model in which the IPA was not a player. 
• The existence of the IPA was at stake. 
• The Basotho electorate had been looking to the IPA and indicated frustrations for 
the coming elections; this would lead to undesirable developments.121 
Furthermore, the government also compromised on the thorniest issue, which had 
plagued the kingdom for decades.  The issue related to the changing of the electoral 
model.  The problem was that changing the model would need certain sections of the 
constitution to change, since the model was enshrined in the constitution.  The 
problem emanated when the government preferred to go through the way of a 
referendum in which the Basotho people would decide whether or not they needed 
the model to be changed.122  This was not part of the agreement and was delaying 
the process for the elections which were supposed to be held the same year. 
The IPA noted that the government kept to the agreement signed in December 1999.  
One line in that agreement stated that the agreement signed was binding among all 
parties and therefore the government should enforce it.  The LCD agreed and signed 
almost all proposals that came from the IPA.  The signing of the agreement gave the 
impression that the LCD was not happy with what was proposed during the 
negotiations.  The problems only came into being when the LCD came with a motion 
to amend the bill; this was a surprise to most opposition parties that were part of the 
authority.  The situation only deteriorated with opposition parties wanting to move out 
of the parliament.  They criticised the government and were backed by the IPA, who 
issued the following statement: 
“As the IPA, we have a problem of working with a dishonest partner, which is 
the government; they want to hold elections in their own terms and they have 
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forgotten that we are the negotiating forum”.123 
This was causing confusion and frustration within the IPA structures.  However, it 
should be noted that the LCD’s refusal to participate was based on the fact that it 
won the elections in 1998 and was entitled to be in office for five years.  The 
presence of SADC was crucial, as it helped to marginalise the monarchy, the chiefs 
and the competing parties.   
The contentious issue, which was the electoral model, was then put on hold while the 
elections, which were supposed to be held within 15-18 months, were also 
postponed.  Political parties were locked in debate about the model and South Africa 
did not intervene to help them solve the problems they were facing.  Instead, Pretoria 
advised the political parties in Lesotho to sort out their own problems.  Even the 
South African delegation, led by deputy foreign minister Aziz Pahad, did not say 
anything to help the IPA to break the stalemate.    
South Africa’s abstinence was a weakness.  Its contribution during the negotiation 
was highly needed, while its failure to mediate during the negotiations process 
delayed the parties from reaching a consensus.  Thus the controversy went to the 
extent where most opposition parties were thinking about pulling out of the Authority.  
Hence there were no elections held in the year 2000 as agreed.  SADC should have 
helped to facilitate the way to elections.   
South Africa should have intervened when there were problems between the IPA and 
the government.  Their stay away from the forum, which they created, was not good 
for the developments in Lesotho and might have had serious implications for the 
African Renaissance vision, which Thabo Mbeki was preaching.  Achieving this 
dream in Lesotho would have required South Africa to actively involve itself in the 
negotiation process rather than to remain as an audience when a stalemate between 
the government and the IPA delayed the elections from being held in 2000.  Pretoria 
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therefore failed to follow up its diplomatic and military intervention with more 
constructive efforts to make the IPA work properly; this despite the fact that they were 
capable of mediating the conflict between the government and the opposition 
parties.124  
5.5 The uneasy way to the elections: Lesotho maps her own path to 
the elections 
Lesotho’s path to a political solution seemed to rely on the people of Lesotho 
themselves.  The IPA, together with the government, had to find a way to deal with 
the outstanding issue of the electoral model without depending on South Africa.  
There was a general realisation that South Africa would not help deliver democracy 
in the mountain kingdom.  The future now depended on the Lesotho government and 
the IPA. 
Political parties in Lesotho decided to hold a meeting, which was heeded by Bishop 
Paul Khoarai at the prime minister’s office.  Present at this meeting were the leaders 
of political parties registered with the new Independent Electoral Commission who 
continued to negotiate the amendments made by the National Assembly.125  The 
meeting was fruitful since all leaders agreed that the PR seats in the parliament 
would be reduced to 40 and the timetable for the elections was then negotiated.  
Credit should therefore be given to the political parties in Lesotho for reaching an 
agreement that would see the elections being held in the country.  However, Lesotho 
was not doing well economically and needed help from her dominant neighbour and 
from elsewhere. 
Fortunately, South Africa was committed to helping its poor neighbour move out of 
this economic stagnation.  This led to the signing of the Joint Bilateral Commission of 
Co-operation (JBCC) between Lesotho and South Africa.  This forum was to help 
Lesotho move from being a least developed country.  The details and objectives of 
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this commission will be explored in detail in the next section. 
5.6 South Africa and economic renaissance in Lesotho 
Lesotho’s economy was not doing well due to the tensions that had plagued the 
country since the SADC intervention.  The looting that followed the presence of the 
SANDF troops in Maseru devastated the economic infrastructure.  The country was 
therefore left with no economic activity that could encourage economic growth in 
peace times.  This situation had an impact on the vision of African Renaissance 
envisaged by Thabo Mbeki.  Lesotho’s economy had to be boosted in order to attract 
investors in the country and also in the region.  Moreover, the political developments 
in the country needed an economic boost in order to encourage a suitable move 
towards democracy.  This necessity fell within the mandate of the JBCC which South 
Africa and Lesotho then signed.126 
The signing of this document was crucial as it indicated South Africa’s commitment 
towards economic recovery in Lesotho, and it also sent a message to the region and 
the continent that Pretoria was committed to the economic recovery of Africa.  
Lesotho was hence a test case for Pretoria’s commitment to the African Renaissance 
vision.  The economic and political problems in Lesotho could not be separated.  
Solving the political crisis would require a stable economic growth.  Thus there was a 
need to sign a bilateral commission between Lesotho and South Africa in order to 
help Lesotho move out of the economic difficulties she was experiencing. 
The were a series of meetings held between the two countries in 2001, and on April 
19th 2001 the JBCC was signed by the South African president Thabo Mbeki and 
Lesotho’s prime minister Phakathi Mosisili.127  This commission was aimed at helping 
Lesotho move from being a least developed country.128   
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The objectives of this commission were to: 
• Guide the strategic partnership between the parties. 
• Promote mutually beneficial economic integration between the two countries with 
the aim of closing the existing economic disparities. 
• Promote cooperation in the field of science and technology with the aim of 
bridging the technological divide which existed between two countries. 
• Cultivate and promote good governance, beneficial social, culture, humanitarian 
and political cooperation and facilitate contact between the public and private 
sectors of the parties. 
• Maintain peace and security between the two countries and general stability in the 
Southern African region through collective action based on the respect for 
democratic institutions, human rights and the rule of law. 
• Cooperate and harmonise the position of the parties in addressing multilateral 
issues of common interest. 
• Facilitate movement of people, goods and services between their two countries, 
taking into consideration the unique geographic position of Lesotho.129 
5.6.1 The election of 2002 and the South African input 
The date for the new election was postponed to May 2002 and the parties finally 
agreed that the National Assembly would consist of 120 seats, 80 of which would be 
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constituency seats and the other, 40 party seats.  This arrangement has not moved 
away from the First-Past-The-Post system, which was used ever since 
independence.  As noted elsewhere in this paper, the party that would win the 
majority of the 80 seats under the new Mix Member Proportional system would 
automatically form the government and thus elect the prime minister.  The system 
has only helped to make sure that the other parties are represented in the 
parliament.   
Nevertheless, the election was in May 2003 and many people came to vote.  The day 
was calm and no violence was reported during the elections.  Instead, most 
observers were happy with the way the elections were held.  The Organisation of 
African Unity observers indicated that: 
“In general, the elections were held in a transparent and credible 
environment, which enabled the Basotho to exercise their democratic rights 
in dignity.” 
The SADC Parliament noted the following: 
“A culture of political maturity and tolerance was witnessed among the 
nineteenth political parties contesting the elections.” 
The overall elections were peaceful and most observers were happy and declared 
the elections to be free and fair.  The LCD won 77 of the 80 seats in the constituency 
and the Lesotho People’s Party (LPP) 1 seat.  There were failed elections in the 
other two constituencies.  In the other 40 seats allocated to parties, the BNP won 21.  
This automatically meant that the LCD would form the government.  Since the MMP 
still has some elements of First-Past-The-Post, the BNP felt that they were cheated 
and launched a complaint in the courts. 
Although peaceful elections seemed to be a success in terms of the African 
Renaissance dream propounded by Thabo Mbeki, problems still existed in Lesotho 
which South Africa could not solve.  Though the country is at peace, there still exists 
mutual suspicion between the political parties in the National Assembly.  Relations 
between the government and the opposition parties are still tense.  The South African 
 76 
High Commissioner in Lesotho explained this when he stated: 
“The relations between the government and opposition parties are still tense; 
all LCD members of parliament are addressed as ‘Honourable’ and the rest 
as ‘Mr’.”  
The political situation in Lesotho will require South Africa to marshal the process of 
national reconciliation.  This will help the country to be politically stable. 
5.7 Conclusion 
The situation in Lesotho will need more help from South Africa if the dream of the 
African Renaissance is to be realised.  Peaceful elections in Lesotho are a good sign 
for the realisation of the dream.  However, South Africa cannot afford to stay away 
from the negotiating forum as it did in Lesotho during the IPA negotiations.  The tiny 
mountain kingdom has not yet reached a state of peace.   
Also, more economic help will be needed to bolster the country to move out of 
poverty.  The JBCC, which was signed between South Africa and Lesotho, was a 
positive move in that direction.  However, there is a need for more help to be given to 
Lesotho for economic growth. 
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Chapter 6 
6 Lessons learnt and recommendations 
The purpose of this thesis was to provide an analysis of the South African 
peacemaking strategy in Lesotho from 1998 to 2002.  In doing this, the thesis 
examined the historical background to the crisis.  What was then discovered was that 
the British colonists introduced a new electoral system called the Westminster 
system in Lesotho.  This system was based on First-Past-The-Post electoral system.  
It led to tensions that have plagued the mountain kingdom of Lesotho since 
independence. 
Chief Jonathan Leabua became the first prime minister of Lesotho in 1965 and his 
era lasted until 1986 when he was ousted by the military.  Although his party lost the 
elections of 1970, he did not relinquish power as the opposition parties expected him 
to seize power.  He then stayed for 16 more years. 
In 1994 tensions developed in Lesotho and escalated to an extent that the king 
intervened in an attempt to solve the political crisis that emerged.  He then decided to 
dismiss the government of Ntsu Mokhehle arguing that is was unfit to govern.  This 
act occurred at a time when the process of democracy was sweeping the region.  
South Africa was moving from apartheid to democracy and could not allow a relapse 
to anarchy in Lesotho.  Thus the president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela; 
Botswana’s Ketumile Masire; and Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe intervened in the 
mountain kingdom to request the king to reinstate the democratically elected 
government of Mokhehle.   
Their diplomatic intervention ended with the king reinstating the democratic 
government.  Although democracy was reinstated, the roots of the crisis were still 
prevalent.  The electoral model was never changed and this created the basis for the 
tensions that erupted in 1998. 
In 1998, elections were held in Lesotho and the electoral model continued to produce 
a controversial winner.  The Basotho National Party won the elections.  This was a 
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breakaway party from the LCD.  The BCP won all the seats in the parliament and the 
opposition parties were not prepared to accept the results.  They marched to the 
king’s palace and demonstrated against the results.  They stayed for a long time at 
the palace than what was allocated to them and this attracted the support of the BCP 
who joined them at the palace.  This led to a clash between the supporters of the 
opposition parties and the supporters of the BCP who wanted to understand why the 
soldiers were not dispersing the demonstrators as the time allocated to them had 
expired. The confrontation between the opposition parties and the BCP increased as 
time wet on and led to a political instability in the country.  
The crisis that emerged prompted the SADC countries South Africa and Botswana to 
intervene in an attempt to maintain order in the country.  The intervention was not 
welcomed by the protestors who thought South Africa was intervening in the 
domestic affairs in their country.  They went on a looting and burning spree of South 
African business in the country.   
South Africa should have consulted properly with the SADC countries and received 
the go ahead of all the countries in the region.  Also, it would have been advisable to 
consider the early warning system before intervening in a domestic crisis.  There 
should be an agreed plan on how to intervene, and when is it the right time to 
intervene in an international conflict.  Furthermore, Pretoria has learnt that its 
hegemonic image will not always be accepted in the region.  The Basotho people 
were prepared to risk their lives in fighting against the South African National 
Defence Force. 
What lessons does the Lesotho crisis and mediation process offer in resolving 
conflicts in the region in the near future and beyond? There are five lessons that can 
be learnt from Lesotho. 
First, the process of peacemaking and peace building should always strive to locate 
the root causes of the conflict. Although there were many dynamics in Lesotho’s 
instability, the electoral model introduced by Britain at independence seem to have 
contributed to the instability that lasted for decades in Lesotho. The electoral model 
produced a winner take all system and peace could not be built on a basis of one 
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party victory over the other.  
Secondly, the process of peacemaking should be inclusive and all the parties should 
be involved in the process. When to Langa report was finalised, the then deputy 
president Thabo Mbeki wanted to present in at the SADC summit where only 
government were invited. It took the intervention of the former president Nelson 
Mandela to halt the report from being presented at the summit and suggested that it 
should be presented in Lesotho in the presence of all the political parties in the 
country. In this way the opposition parties felt that they were part of the peacemaking 
structure in their own country. 
Third, the peace process should create institutions locally, which would handle issues 
of negotiations and discussions between the government and the opposition parties. 
There would not be a lasting peace if the government and the opposition parties are 
not communicating to each other. The plat for negotiation managed by the locals is 
therefore necessary for a lasting peace. 
Fourth, external intervention should try not to use military means to fostering peace. 
In Lesotho, South Africa and Botswana intervened militarily in response to the crisis 
that emerged after the 1998 elections. The local saw this as an invention of their 
country and went on a looting spree to voice their dislike of t he presence of foreign 
troops in their own country. The military should only be used to back up negotiations 
that are already in place. 
Fifth, peace efforts would always take time and therefore it is important to maintain 
patience at all time. Negotiators should not expect a quick response and immediate 
results in a crisis situation. 
In summary, the Lesotho crisis indicated a need for peacemaking initiatives to fully 
understand the root causes of the crisis they are dealing with. Negotiations included 
all the stake holders in the country and how states resources should be distributed. 
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